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Abstract 
 
Chapter 1 presents a short introduction to Russia’s economy in 2013, 
showing that the country has become more dependent on natural 
resource exports during the last 15 years, despite attempts by the 
Russian state to diversify the economy. I then undertake a short 
comparison of industrial policy and institutions in Russia and China. I 
argue that two reasons why China has been more successful than 
Russia in implementing industrial policy and diversifying its economy 
is the country’s pro-growth incentive structure, and its focus on 
absorbing technology from abroad.  
Chapter 2 studies the change in incentives faced by Russian regional 
governors, after gubernatorial elections were replaced by presidential 
appointments in 2004. Using an ordered probit model, the chapter 
examines how various measures of economic performance and political 
loyalty affect the probability of Russian regional governors to stay in 
office. While before the 2004 reform, the likelihood to stay in office 
seems not to depend on political loyalty to the centre, after the reform 
election results for the president and the Kremlin party play a strong 
and significant role in explaining the likelihood of regional governors 
to stay in office, while economic performance has a negative effect. I 
interpret these results as evidence that after the reform in 2004, the 
ruling elites in Moscow started using appointments of regional officials 
to consolidate their political control over the country, while 
performance-related criteria play only a secondary role. 
Chapter 3 presents a novel dataset containing 312 cases of illegal 
corporate raiding (reiderstvo) that took place between 1999 and 2010 in 
Russia, assembled through a comprehensive scan of Russian national 
and regional newspaper archives. Analysing the dataset, I am able to 
identify a shift in both the regional and sectoral distribution of raiding 
cases over time, as well as an increasing involvement of state agencies 
in illegal raiding attacks. Using a fixed-effects panel model, I find that 
regional election results for the ruling president and his party, as well 
as the degree to which elections are manipulated throughout Russia’s 
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regions, are significantly and positively correlated with the number of 
raiding cases in a given region. I also find that regions in which 
governors have stronger ties to their region suffer from a lower degree 
of attacks. A possible interpretation of these results is that under 
Russia’s new authoritarian electoral regime, the centre tolerates a 
certain amount of rent-seeking and predatory activities by regional 
elites, as long as these elites are able to provide a sufficiently high level 
of electoral support for the centre. I further argue that the results 
concerning the local attachment of regional governors can be seen as 
evidence confirming Mancur Olson’s theory on stationary and roving 
bandits.  
 
Chapter 4 (written together with Letizia Montinari) investigates 
differences in and determinants of technical efficiency across three 
groups of OECD, Asian and Latin American countries. In the literature, 
the kind of technical efficiency we examine is seen as one of the main 
factors influencing the ability of a country to absorb technology from 
abroad. Using a stochastic frontier framework and data for 22 
manufacturing sectors for 1996-2005, we find notable differences in 
technical efficiency between the three country groups we examine. We 
then investigate the effect of human capital and domestic R&D, proxied 
by the stock of patents, on technical efficiency. We find that while 
human capital has always a strongly positive effect on efficiency, an 
increase in the stock of patents has positive effects on efficiency in high-
tech sectors, but negative effects in low-tech sectors. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction1 
1.1 Russia in the World Economy 
22 years after the end of the Soviet Union, and 15 years after a period of 
serious economic decline, the Russian Federation has re-emerged as 
one of the world’s biggest economies. At the beginning of 2013, Russia 
was the eight largest economy in the world by nominal value, and the 
sixth largest by purchasing power parity2.  
As the host of the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sotchi and of the FIFA 
World Cup in 2018, as well as a member of the BRIC group of emerging 
economies, Russia has also regained much of the international standing 
it lost during the chaotic decade of the 1990s.  
However, a closer look at the performance of the Russian economy 
during the last 15 years reveals that the country is actually facing a 
number of problems that make its future look much less promising 
than that of many other emerging economies. A recent report by the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development shows that the 
Russian economy today is actually less diversified and more dependent 
on oil and gas exports than it was 15 years ago (figure 1.1, EBRD 2012), 
despite numerous policy initiatives by the Russian government to 
foster economic diversification and modernization during the last 
decade3.  
                                                          
1 In parts, this introduction is based on Rochlitz (2012). 
2 CIA World Factbook (2012) 
3 Examples are the re-grouping of various industries into large, state-controlled holdings 
(the so called “state-corporations”), the attempt to create innovation clusters (such as the 
innovation project Skolkovo near Moscow, the science town Dubna, or the innovation 
cluster “Titanium Valley” near Yekaterinburg), and the attempt to build frontier 
innovation capacities in high-technology sectors such as nanotechnology.   
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Figure 1.1: Share of Russian oil and gas in selected economic indicators 
Graph from EBRD (2012, page 14); data sources: US Energy Information Administration, 
IMF, Russian Finance Ministry, Rosstat. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Value of oil produced per capita in 2010  
Graph from EBRD (2012, page 16); data sources: US Energy Information Administration, 
IMF; selected countries only; oil valued at international prices. 
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As the per capita value of natural resources produced in Russia is not 
exceptionally high in international comparison (see figure 1.2, EBRD 
2012), and as resources will last only for another 20 years at current 
rates of extraction (EBRD 2012, page 16), the inability of the Russian 
economy to structurally change and open up new fields of comparative 
advantage might put the country’s current levels of income per capita 
and its current position in the world economy at risk in the not too 
distant future. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: New firms as a % of total firms 
Graph from EBRD 2012, page 32; data sources: Klapper et al. (2006), Bruno et al. (2011); 
based on 1998-1999 data, unless otherwise indicated; “new firms” are companies in their 
first or second year in business. 
 
It would therefore be imperative for Russia to use its current window 
of opportunity, made possible by high oil prices and still extensive 
natural resource reserves, to develop new capabilities and competitive 
industries in various sectors throughout the country. However, instead 
of diversifying and modernizing, the Russian economy seems actually 
to have become less dynamic over time. For example, firm entry rates 
have been consistently declining over the last decade. While at the 
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beginning of the 2000s, firm entry was higher in Russia than in many 
other transition or Western European countries, by the end of the 
decade entry rates had become much lower than in other countries 
(figure 1.3, EBRD 2012), with the low quality of regional institutions 
being one of the main determinants of low entry rates (figure 1.4, EBRD 
2012). 
Figure 1.4: Russian regions: firm entry and institutional environment 
(1996 – 2008) Graph from EBRD 2012, page 32; data sources: Bruno et al. (2011), Expert 
Rating Agency; higher levels of investment risk corresponding to a more difficult 
business climate. 
 
 
Russia’s lacking economic dynamism during the last decade becomes 
especially apparent once we compare the country to other emerging 
economies. Looking at GDP growth rates for the BRIC countries, we see 
that after 8 years of relatively high growth rates between 1999 and 2007, 
Russia’s growth has been trailing off since 2008, especially with respect 
to China and India, even though oil prices have soon reached pre-crisis 
levels again (figure 5).  
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Figure 5: GDP growth rates for Russia, China and India (1998-2012) / 
Real Oil Prices Left y-axis: annual GDP growth rates in %; right y-axis: annual 
average imported crude oil price to the US; Data sources: World Development Indicators; 
US Energy Information Administration 
 
 
If we then look more in detail on a number of specific aspects of the 
Russian economy, such as Russia’s manufacturing sector, science & 
technology or the development of infrastructure in Russia, we see why 
growth during the first decade of the 2000s was mainly driven by high 
international oil prices, rather than by more fundamental characteristics 
of the Russian economy.  
Comparing Russia with China is particularly striking in this respect. 
For example, while China has managed to build a couple of 
competitive manufacturing industries from scratch during the last 15 
years (e.g. in the automobile, aircraft and high-speed railway sector), 
often with the help of aggressive industrial policies (McGregor 2010, 
Heilmann and Shih 2013), market shares for Russian manufacturing 
industries in the same sectors have been constantly declining over time, 
despite similar support by the Russian state (Rochlitz 2009, 2012). 
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Comparing the science and technology sector (S&T) in both countries is 
equally illustrative. While Russia still has a quantitatively very 
important research and innovation sector (if measured by the number 
of researchers per capita), the general quality of research, as well as the 
output of high-quality research produced in Russia is relatively low, 
and has been stagnating over time (figure 6).  
Figure 6: Patent Applications / Number of Researchers for Russia and 
China Left y-axis: Patent applications by residents; right y-axis: number of R&D 
researchers per million residents; data source: World Development Indicators  
 
 
Apart from patent filings, during the last 15 years China has overtaken 
Russia with respect to a number of further S&T indicators, such as R&D 
expenditure as percentage of GDP, publications in peer-reviewed 
journals, university rankings, the number of students abroad, or the 
percentage of international students in national universities. For 
example, between 1998 and 2008 the annual number of publications in 
peer-reviewed journals has increased by 400% to 112000 in China, 
while in Russia it has stagnated at a level of about 20 000 (Balzer 2011, 
pages 4-10). 
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China has also been more successful than Russia “in fostering 
university-based R&D, developing university linkages with industry, 
integrating its universities with the global higher education sector, and 
encouraging talented co-nationals to return home” (Balzer 2011, page 
2). Interestingly, China has achieved all this despite starting from a 
much lower base of science and education resources. 
Finally, comparing the development of infrastructure in both countries 
provides us again with a similar picture. While China has developed its 
infrastructure at high speed, not much has happened in terms of 
infrastructure development in Russia during the last 15 years. 
For instance, the Chinese government has pushed forward an 
ambitious program of high-speed rail construction, with 13000 km of 
new lines for bullet trains due to be completed by 2012 (Bradsher 2010). 
Air- and sea-port capacity in the country has been expanding rapidly, 
while China has also recently constructed 53600 km of new 
expressways, making the country’s expressway system the second 
largest in the world after the one of the US4 (Bai and Qian, 2010).  
During the same time span, the total length of paved roads in Russia 
actually declined from 750 000 km to 700 000 km, mainly because of 
insufficient funds allotted to road maintenance (Nemtsov and Milov 
2008). Nemtsov and Milov argue that this has been a consequence of 
the federal road funds being abolished in the year 2000, with 
Pynnöniemi (2008) maintaining that this abolition resulted in the 
decline of the share of road investment relative to GDP from 3% in 2000 
to 1% in 2007. 
Looking on Russian railways, the picture is similar. Although plans to 
build a high-speed train link between Moscow and St. Petersburg (the 
first such link in Russia) exist since the early 1990s, the starting date for 
construction has continuously been postponed, with completion now 
                                                          
4 The Economist (14.02.2008), China’s Infrastructure Splurge: Rushing on by Road, Rail and 
Air. 
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being projected for 20185. Plans for a high-speed train between Moscow 
and Yekaterinburg have been shelved after several years of preliminary 
planning6. Although state-owned Russian Railways have repeatedly 
announced substantial long-term investment plans, much of current 
investment spending is used to keep the existing system working, 
instead of expanding capacity, despite constantly growing demand. 
The only notable exception are investments in Sochi for the Winter 
Olympics in 2014, although these investments arguably do not respond 
to the core needs of the Russian economy7. 
Most airports in Russia are badly in need of modernization, with only 
two (Domodedovo and Sheremetyevo) having been certified as third 
category by the International Civil Aviation Organization in 2010 (third 
category meaning that an airport has the equipment to let planes land 
safely even in zero visibility conditions)8. Finally, those infrastructure 
investments actually occurring seem often to be more of a prestige 
nature than responding to actual economic needs, such as the costly 
bridge and conference centre constructed on a sparsely inhabited island 
near Vladivostok, for the APEC summit in 2012. 
A general feature seems to be that while officials in China announce the 
successful completion of projects, officials in Russia announce the start 
of investment and construction projects for the near future, with the 
projects then losing steam or being scaled down. Especially Russia’s 
newly established state corporations seem to be rather inefficient in 
implementing infrastructure modernization, investment and 
innovation projects (Sprenger 2010, Kessler and Levin 2012, Gershman 
2013), while at the same time local governments in China outcompete 
each other with investments into infrastructure (Qian and Roland 1998, 
Zhang 2011). 
                                                          
5 pravda.ru, (29.04.2011), From Moscow to St. Petersburg in 2.5 hours. 
6 Delovoi Kvartal, (24.09.2012), interview with Aleksei Bagariakov, dkvartal.ru 
7 emg.rzd.ru, Investment Programmes,  
(http://eng.rzd.ru/statice/public/rzdeng?STRUCTURE_ID=294&) 
8 CBS News, 26.04.2010, Polish Crash Shows Russia’s Crumbling Airports 
(http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-6391139.html) 
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1.2 Institutions and Incentives 
 
Why is Russia performing so much worse than a number of other, 
comparable emerging economies? A number of renowned Russia-
watchers have attributed Russia’s recent lower growth rate to the 
country’s deficient institutional system, arguing that it is likely that the 
country’s growth rate will stabilize somewhere around 3% to 4% or 
lower during the next couple of years, if no significant institutional 
reforms are undertaken (see e.g. Hanson 2012). 
The argument I make in this dissertation goes into a similar direction. I 
argue that the way Russia’s current institutional system is organized 
makes it difficult for the Russian state to successfully carry out the kind 
of industrial policies Russia has tried to implement during the last 
couple of years. I further claim that Russia’s failure to achieve tangible 
results in the sphere of innovation, science & technology and 
infrastructure is also related to the way the country’s institutions are 
working. An especially important role in this respect is played by the 
incentives faced by bureaucrats and state officials.      
An extensive literature has examined why industrial policy has been 
successful in some contexts, and not in others. In a nutshell, the aim of 
industrial policy is to give domestic companies the necessary time to 
learn and become competitive on world markets.  
However, for subsidies to work, a subsidy-receiving company in an 
infant industry, or in an industry experiencing economic transition, has 
to face strong incentives to become competitive as soon as possible. 
Promoting competition among subsidy recipients, enforcing sunset 
clauses or putting a requirement in place to start exporting after a 
certain time period are crucial in this respect. Therefore, key 
requirements for industrial policy success are the capability of a state to 
discipline recipients of subsidies and learning rents, to credibly enforce 
sunset clauses, and to foster necessary levels of competition (Khan and 
Jomo, 2000). 
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To be able to successfully administer such policies, bureaucrats and 
state officials must be embedded enough with local companies to be 
able to make informed choices (1), but sufficiently autonomous and 
motivated (2) to avoid being captured by businesses that want to 
extend the payment of subsidies beyond a time span economically 
sensible (Evans 1995). A number of authors have argued that it was 
exactly because such conditions of embedded autonomy where in place in 
Japan, Taiwan or South Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s that these 
countries were able to catch up economically to the West (Johnson 1982, 
Amsden 1989, Wade 1990).  
In this dissertation, I argue that Russian bureaucrats lack this second 
crucial ingredient (autonomy / motivation) to make industrial policy 
work in the country. While Russian state officials are generally well 
educated and most probably informed enough about the kind of 
policies they should be implementing to make industrial, infrastructure 
and technology policies work9, they face the wrong incentives to 
implement and enforce these policies.  
As I show empirically in chapter 2 for Russian regional governors, 
instead of being rewarded for creating economic growth in their 
respective district, city or region, Russian officials are rewarded for 
delivering political support to the ruling elites in the federal centre. In 
other words, the mayor of a town where an important innovation 
project fails to produce expected results will probably not be fired 
because the project failed. However, if during the next Duma elections 
the Kremlin party United Russia fails to come up first in his city, the 
mayor’s chances to keep his job are slim. As a result, the mayor will 
probably rather continue to pay subsidies to the town’s factory and 
turn a blind eye on lacking progress in the innovation project, as long 
as the factory director promises to convince his employees to vote for 
the Kremlin party during the next elections (see Frye, Reuter and 
Szakonyi 2012 for an analysis of voter mobilization in Russian factories, 
                                                          
9 For example, Frye, Reuter, Buckley (2011) show that governors appointed during recent 
years were better qualified than their predecessors, with many holding university 
degrees in economics.  
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and the role played by local mayors and regional governors in this 
respect).  
As a result, the significant sums of money pumped into innovation and 
modernization projects every year by the central Russian state produce 
unsatisfactory results, as local officials are not sufficiently motivated to 
enforce performance criteria or sunset clauses for subsidy recipients. 
Successfully implementing infrastructure projects also seems only to 
have a negligible impact on the probability of an official to be 
promoted, compared with the benefits attached to delivering political 
support. In addition, big infrastructure projects are inherently risky, 
and if such a project fails the further career of the responsible state 
official might well be over10. Together with the overall adverse 
incentive structure, the fact that the central state does not encourage 
risk taking by local officials might be another explanation why big 
infrastructure projects in Russia often lose steam before they have 
really started.      
Looking on the involvement of state officials in criminal corporate 
raiding attacks in chapter 3, I even find some evidence that the central 
state might tolerate a certain degree of predatory activities by regional 
state officials, as long as these same officials deliver sufficiently high 
levels of political support to the federal centre. In other words, as long 
as election results for the Kremlin party and candidate in Duma and 
presidential elections are sufficiently high in a given region, successful 
entrepreneurs in the region cannot necessarily count on the central 
state to defend them against predatory local state agencies. As a result, 
Russia still suffers from relatively insecure property rights and an 
adverse investment climate in many regions, which in turn negatively 
affect firm entry and economic dynamism. 
Comparing Russia with China again provides an interesting 
perspective in this respect. Since the onset of economic reform in 1978, 
                                                          
10 Interview by the author with the editor in chief of the journal “Ural Expert”, 
Yekaterinburg, October 10th, 2012.  
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China has put a system into place where the appointment of 
government officials is centralized, while at the same time regional 
administrations have a lot of autonomy concerning the implementation 
of economic policy. Thus, the Chinese system after 1978 is not too 
different from the Russian system after the 2004 reform that replaced 
elections of regional governors by presidential appointments.  
However, in China’s “regionally decentralized authoritarian system” 
(Xu 2011), the overarching incentive faced by government officials at all 
administrative levels throughout the country is to promote economic 
growth, as economic performance is the most important criterion used 
to decide if regional officials are promoted or not (Bo 2002, Tsui and 
Wang 2004, Li and Zhou 2005, Landry 2008). Since Deng Xiaoping 
started reforming China’s incentive system in the late 1970s, political 
loyalty has become a much less important determinant of career 
success (Vogel 2011), even though loyalty still seems to play an 
important role in determining for example party rankings within the 
Chinese Communist Party (Shih et al., 2012). 
At the same time that appointments and promotions are decided by the 
centre in Beijing, economic decision-making at the regional and local 
level is often very decentralized, giving local administrations a lot of 
possibilities to experiment with different policy solutions, and learn 
from each other (Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995, Florini, Lay and 
Tan 2012).  
While the 1994 tax reform provided local governments with sufficient 
income to implement meaningful industrial and economic policies 
(Wong 2000, Tsui and Wang 2004), the strong competition for 
investment between different provinces together with China's 
centralized cadre promotion system thus provides local officials with 
large enough incentives to use these possibilities in an efficient way. 
Furthermore, China's centralized cadre promotion system also seems to 
be relatively efficient in promoting talent. While Yao and Zhang (2012) 
show that more capable local leaders are more likely to get promoted, 
Li et al. (2007) argue that the way the Chinese Communist Party is 
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choosing new members makes sure that party members have above-
average abilities. Thus, it seems that Chinese state officials are on 
average able administrators. However (and in contrast to Russian state 
officials), due to the incentives they face they also seem to be 
autonomous enough to avoid being captured by businesses to an extent 
that would endanger the country's growth potential. 
A further particularity in China's institutional set-up is that 
entrepreneurs generally get meaningful help and support by the state 
only once they have reached a certain level of success. For example, 
while it is relatively difficult for start-ups to get financing, life is getting 
much easier the more successful an entrepreneur becomes (Tsai 2004). 
Entrepreneurs in China thus face strong incentives to grow, to reach a 
critical size and to make their success visible, in contrast to Russian 
entrepreneurs, who often try to “stay under the radar”11 once they have 
become successful, in order to avoid the attention of criminal groups or 
predatory state officials. 
In sum, incentives for bureaucrats and entrepreneurs in China often 
overlap and are aligned around the common objective of economic 
growth. Even in sectors where the Chinese state is not directly 
promoting an industry, local bureaucrats try to help or at least to avoid 
being too obstructive, as economic success in their locality ultimately 
benefits their career as well. At the same time, small firms try to fast 
reach a critical size, as this is the best way to consolidate their business 
and to ensure government support and additional growth in the future. 
In contrast, Russian entrepreneurs and state officials face a whole array 
of incentives that make it more difficult for new firms to enter, 
innovation to happen, for firms to grow, and for industrial policy to 
produce results. To make the Russian economy more dynamic and 
                                                          
11 The expression “staying under the radar” comes from a Russian entrepreneur with 
whom I had a conversation on a train from Moscow to Simferopol, in late 2008. He told 
me that his business was going well, but that he avoided advertising his success, in order 
not to attract the attention of predatory state agencies.  
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industrial policy in the country successful, a fundamental reform of 
Russia’s current institutional set-up would be necessary.  
However, as I will show in chapters 2 and 3, Russia’s current incentive 
structure is one of the foundations on which the hold on power of the 
country’s ruling elites is based. These elites have therefore no 
incentives to reform the system, as such a reform would put their own 
position into danger. The Russian Federation in 2013 is thus an 
example of a country where the ruling elites, faced by a trade-off 
between economic growth and political control over the country, seem 
to have chosen the second over the first objective.     
 
1.3 Absorptive Capacity and Innovation 
 
While chapters 2 and 3 below are closely related to the topic introduced 
above, the empirical study of absorptive capacity presented in chapter 
4 (written together with Letizia Montinari12) stands on its own. 
However, the questions introduced by chapter 4 are actually not 
unrelated to the situation of the Russian economy today.  
In chapter 4, we have tried to find a methodology that is able to 
measure the ability of developing and emerging economies to absorb 
technology developed abroad. Various case studies of economies that 
have successfully managed to economically catch up have shown that 
being able to absorb technology developed elsewhere has played a 
crucial role in these countries (see Johnson (1982) for a study on Japan, 
Amsden (1989) for South Korea, Wade (1990) for Taiwan and more 
recently Breznitz and Murphree (2011) for China).  
China again provides probably the most illustrative example in this 
respect. One of the major initiatives pushed forward by Deng Xiaoping 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s was to buy technology from abroad, 
                                                          
12 University of Trento 
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and to learn how to adopt this technology to China (Vogel 2011). Over 
a vast range of manufacturing sectors, China thus bought foreign 
technology or entered into joint-ventures with foreign companies, in 
order to learn how to use this technology at home (Thun 2005, 
McGregor 2010, Ernst 2011).  
As a result of these policies, a range of new manufacturing industries 
emerged throughout the country. While a couple of years ago, these 
industries still suffered from often severe quality deficiencies, within-
country competition and China’s specific incentive structure made it 
possible that they eventually learned how to adopt and use foreign 
technology in an efficient way. Today, these industries are now fast 
becoming competitive on world markets, and have recently started to 
innovate by themselves13.  
An example that illustrates the differences in technology policy 
between Russia and China is a joint-venture between Siemens and a 
number of Chinese train companies in the early 2000s, to produce 60 
Velaro high-speed trains in China. Siemens had to agree to transfer a 
significant amount of technology to its Chinese partners, who now are 
building the next generation of Velaro trains by themselves, with 
Siemens remaining involved only as a minor supplier (Lee 2012, Massie 
2012). Effectively enforced government policies that made wide-
ranging transfer of technology a condition for the joint-venture played 
a key role during the deal (McGregor 2010).  
Although Siemens initially proposed a similar agreement to Russia, 
Russian Railways finally simply bought 8 Velaro trains from Germany, 
together with a 30-year maintenance contract. While China has now a 
thriving industry of high-speed trains, for Russia the deal did not entail 
any significant technology transfer14. It is not improbable that the risk- 
                                                          
13 An example being the Shanghai Motor Show 2013, where for the first time Chinese car 
makers have presented models that seem to be equal or even superior in quality to 
models presented by their Western competitors, see e.g. Der Spiegel, 23.04.2013, Autos aus 
China: Schluss mit Schrott.   
14 Railway Gazette, 01.06.2006, “Velaro RUS to St. Petersburg”. 
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and growth-adverse incentive climate prevalent in Russia played an 
important role in shaping the decision of state-owned Russian Railways 
to opt for the second, less risky but also less beneficial contract with 
Siemens.  
It thus seems that apart from Russia’s adverse incentive climate, a 
further point hampering growth prospects of the country is the very 
nature of the industrial policy initiatives attempted by the Russian 
state. While China and a number of other successful East Asian 
economies have focused on absorbing technology from abroad before 
starting to innovate themselves, current policy by the Russian 
government tries instead to leap-frog this intermediate stage, in trying 
to build innovative indigenous industries from scratch, while 
technology absorption is not a special priority. 
An example is the nanotechnology industry. Although Russia has no 
significant production facilities in nanotechnologies, and is still 
relatively far away from the global technological frontier, since 2007 the 
Russian state has bookmarked important resources to build domestic 
innovation capabilities in nanotechnology (about $3.3 billion until 2015, 
see Connolly 2012). However, results are rather disappointing to date, 
with the private sector remaining reluctant to join state-financed 
initiatives, and with Russia’s share in the global nanoindustry market 
remaining very low. Connolly (2012) thus argues that it seems to be too 
early for Russia to attempt building new domestic high-technology 
industries. 
If one considers the examples of the successful economies in Asia, it 
would probably be advisable for Russia to focus on absorbing foreign 
technology instead, in order to modernize the country’s often outdated 
industrial infrastructure, before starting to concentrate on fostering 
domestic innovation.  
While chapter 4 focuses on two basic determinants of absorptive 
capacity (human capital and domestic R&D), in future research (once 
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better data becomes available15) it would therefore be interesting to 
empirically investigate the institutional determinants of absorptive 
capacity, which might provide interesting insights for contexts such as 
the Russian Federation. 
Investigating the institutional determinants of absorptive capacity 
empirically is a promising subject to study, as presumably both 
promoting successful technology absorption, and building domestic 
high-tech industries necessitates the kind of embedded but 
autonomous state bureaucracy described above, if these objectives are 
to be achieved by state-led industrial policies.  
As the Russian bureaucracy so far lacks these characteristics, and as 
institutional reform looks unlikely under the country’s current regime, 
replacing some industrial policies by a more open economic regime 
might be the last option available to reintroduce competition and 
economic dynamism to the country. Probably, Russia’s decision to 
finally join the WTO in late 2012 was motivated by this idea, at least to 
a certain extent.   
The remaining three chapters of this dissertation will now empirically 
investigate some of the topics raised above. Chapter 2 will look on the 
change in the incentive structure for Russian governors, once 
gubernatorial elections were replaced by presidential appointments in 
2004. Chapter 3 will introduce a novel dataset on corporate raiding 
attacks in Russia, to investigate why corrupt state agencies have 
increasingly become involved in the criminal theft of corporate 
property in the country. Finally, chapter 4 presents a joint work with 
Letizia Montinari, where we examine the factors that determine the 
ability of developing countries to absorb technology developed abroad.  
 
 
                                                          
15 The problem we faced in our study was data availability. For many countries 
(including the Russian Federation and most other former Soviet republics), sectoral data 
of the kind we use in chapter 4 is not yet available, or has only very recently become 
available.  
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Chapter 2 
Elections vs. Appointments: 
Comparing Incentive Patterns for 
Russian Governors under Putin 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In early September 2004, a hostage crisis in the Southern Russian city of 
Beslan claimed more than 380 victims, after a rescue attempt by federal 
police forces went awry. During late 2004, the Beslan crisis had 
widespread political repercussions in Russia, triggering a government 
reform that lead to the consolidation of power around the Kremlin and 
the president of Russia, while Russia’s formerly powerful regional 
governors were weakened.  
At the core of this centralizing reform was the abolishment of 
gubernatorial elections. While from the mid-1990s up to 2004, the 
powerful leaders of Russia’s more than 80 regions were publicly elected 
in their regions, from 2005 onwards the Russian president had the right 
to appoint and dismiss regional governors. Only in late 2012 were 
gubernatorial elections tentatively reintroduced in some of Russia’s 
regions. 
The centralizing reforms carried out in late 2004 constitute an 
interesting natural experiment, and provide a promising testing ground 
to examine a couple of questions. To what extent has switching from 
gubernatorial elections to presidential appointments helped the 
Kremlin to enhance its political control over Russia’s regions, and over 
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the country as a whole? Are there differences in the economic and 
social outcomes produced by elections and appointments of regional 
governors in an electoral authoritarian regime such as the Russian 
Federation? In the case of appointments, might there be a trade-off 
between political loyalty and economic performance? How do the 
incentives faced by regional governors differ between both institutional 
mechanisms?  
An extensive literature has looked on appointment patterns for 
regional officials throughout various institutional contexts. A number 
of especially interesting studies has examined the incentive climate in 
China. For example, Li and Zhou (2005) have shown that during the 
reform era, economic performance seems to be the main criterion 
determining the promotion of regional officials in China’s provinces. 
They find that the higher is the personal economic performance of a 
regional executive, the higher are his chances to stay in office or to be 
promoted. Li and Zhou argue that in the context of China's specific 
institutional system where economic decision-making is decentralized 
but personnel appointments are centralized, this incentive structure has 
been one of the main drivers of China's economic success. 
Other studies on China’s system of centralized personnel control have 
found similar results, showing how the country’s appointment system 
creates pro-growth incentives for local officials (Bo 1996, 2002, Li 1998, 
Landry 2008, Yao and Zhang 2012). Zheng et al. (2012) found that apart 
from growth, environmental protection has also recently become an 
important criterion determining the promotion of urban officials in 
China. However, in another recent study Shih et al. (2012) employ a 
novel Bayesian method to challenge this consensus, in arguing that 
political loyalty has remained a major determinant of party rank 
positions within the Chinese Communist Party. 
The literature on appointments of regional officials and centre-region 
relations in Russia is equally vast. A number of studies have examined 
gubernatorial elections and presidential appointments of regional 
governors in the country, using different methodologies and adopting 
different perspectives (see e.g. Stoner-Weiss 1999, 2002, Chebankova 
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2006, Konitzer 2006, Goode 2007, Wegren and Konitzer 2007, Reisinger 
and Moraski 2009, 2011, Reuter 2010, Sharifutdinova 2010, Turovsky 
2010, Blakkisrud 2011, Frye, Reuter, Buckley 2011, Reuter and 
Robertson 2011 or Nye and Vasileva 2012 - a detailed discussion of the 
literature on Russia will be held in section 2.2). Generally, studies find 
that political loyalty has become a more important selection criterion 
for regional governors after 2004, once elections were replaced by 
appointments (Reuter and Robertson 2011, Reisinger and Moraski 
2011). An increasing co-optation of regional and federal elites around 
the Kremlin party United Russia, consolidating authoritarian 
tendencies in the Russian Federation, has also been identified (Reuter 
and Remington 2009, Gelman 2010, Mendras 2012).  
Apart from the country-specific literature on Russia and China, the 
question of how to appoint bureaucrats and regional officials in order 
to achieve desired outcomes has also been studied by a more general 
literature. While Jones and Olken (2005) have found that the 
characteristics of individual leaders do matter for economic growth, 
Evans and Rauch (1999) underline the importance of meritocratic 
selection procedures. However, how best to achieve meritocratic 
selection, and the role played by elections and appointments in this 
respect, remains a question under debate.  
Besley and Coate (2003) argue that US states where regulators are 
elected (instead of being appointed) are more pro-consumer in their 
regulatory policies. In contrast, Maskin and Tirole (2004) find that 
appointed officials produce better outcomes in contexts where the 
public is poorly informed about the issues at stake. Alesina and 
Tabellini (2007, 2008) examine the incentives faced by appointed 
bureaucrats and elected politicians from a theoretical perspective, and 
find that generally bureaucrats perform better for technical tasks for 
which ability is more important than effort, as well as in cases where 
vested interests play a role, while elected politicians are preferable if 
there is uncertainty about social preferences. Looking on justices in US 
states' Supreme Courts, Iaryczower et al. (2013) argue that justices that 
are appointed perform better than those that are elected.  
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While the above papers study the question in the context of the United 
States, investigating elections and appointments of regional officials in 
an electoral authoritarian regime such as Russia introduces a further 
dimension to be taken into account. Levitsky and Way (2002) classify 
Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime, which they define as a 
regime where elections exist and are viewed as the primary means to 
obtain power, but where incumbents violate the rules to such an extent 
that even minimum democratic standards are not observed. In such 
regimes, despite widespread electoral fraud, elections still play an 
important role in providing legitimacy for the ruling elites, in 
permitting the elites in power to co-opt opponents and to judge the 
performance of subordinates (who are expected to mobilize electoral 
support), or in mitigating commitment problems between a dictator 
and the different clans and factions on whose support the dictator has 
to rely (Magaloni 2008, Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, Svolik 2012).  
Obtaining high levels of turnout and high results in national elections 
thus remains crucial for the ruling elites to defend and legitimize their 
hold on power. Consequently, they have to make sure that lower-level 
officials throughout the country deliver sufficiently high levels of 
turnout and electoral support for the president and the ruling party in 
national elections. In cases where regional officials are appointed by the 
ruling elites, political loyalty thus becomes an important criterion 
determining the selection of regional officials. However, the economic 
performance of these officials also remains important. One of the main 
reasons for Vladimir Putin's popularity during his first two terms in 
office has been Russia's relative high levels of economic growth during 
the period. Moreover, Reuter and Gandhi (2011) show how the 
likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties such as the Kremlin 
party United Russia increases as income declines.  
In a competitive authoritarian regime like that of contemporary Russia, 
the ruling elites thus have to appoint regional officials that are, ideally, 
both politically loyal and economically competent. The problem here is 
that there might well be a trade-off between political loyalty and 
economic performance. Looking at a cross-section of countries, Wagner 
  
27 
 
(2011) finds evidence for such a trade-off, with agency competence 
being the lower the more important is loyalty and the shorter are time 
horizons. Focusing on authoritarian regimes, Egorov and Sonin (2011) 
have shown that rulers might prefer to hire mediocre but loyal 
subordinates, in order to mitigate the risk of being overthrown. More 
specifically, Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi (2012) found that employers in 
the least dynamic sectors in Russia are especially likely to mobilize 
their workers to vote for the regime. In order to demonstrate his 
political loyalty to the centre, a Russian regional governor might thus 
give preferential treatment to firms that otherwise perform badly or 
would probably be closed down, as these firms are most likely to 
provide the necessary electoral support during national elections.  
In this paper, I want to test to what extent concerns of political loyalty 
and economic competence determine appointment decisions of 
regional governors in a competitive authoritarian regime, the Russian 
Federation. I also want to test to what extent the incentives faced by 
governors differ between an electoral and an appointment regime. In 
order to make my results comparable to results obtained for China by 
Li and Zhou (2005), I use an ordered probit specification that is as 
similar as possible to their study of Chinese provincial governors, 
together with a newly compiled dataset on Russian gubernatorial 
elections and appointments from 1999 to 2012. 
In contrast to the results found by Li and Zhou (2005) for China, this 
paper finds that economic and social outcomes have almost always an 
insignificant or negative effect on the probability of a Russian regional 
governor to be re-elected, re-appointed or promoted. Most strikingly, 
once the federal centre started appointing its candidates in earnest (i.e. 
from 2007 onwards), the personal economic performance of a regional 
governor has a strong, significant and negative effect on her or his 
probability to remain in office. In other words, from 2007 onwards the 
better a governor performs economically, the lower are her or his 
chances to remain in office. On the other hand, from 2007 to 2012 
political loyalty has a significant and positive effect on the probability 
of a governor to remain in office or to be promoted.  
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I interpret these findings as evidence that in contrast to the Chinese 
Communist Party in Beijing, the Kremlin uses gubernatorial 
appointments not to promote economic growth, but to generate 
political support for the ruling elites in the federal centre. I then also 
argue that the resulting adverse incentive structure faced by regional 
officials might be one of the reasons for the lack of economic dynamism 
that Russia has experienced during recent years (see e.g. EBRD 2012).  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the context of 
centre-region relations in Russia, the particular role played by Russia’s 
governors, and the 2004 reform that replaced gubernatorial elections 
with presidential appointments. Parts 2.3 and 2.4 introduce the 
econometric specification and the data used. Part 2.5 presents the 
regression results, and part 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 Russia’s Governors under Putin 
 
During the unstable 1990s, Russia's 89 regions16 managed to gather a 
significant degree of autonomy with respect to the federal centre in 
Moscow (Stoner-Weiss 1999). An important role in this respect was 
played by the executive heads of Russia's regions, which for simplicity I 
will refer to as “governors” in this paper (although the rulers of 
Russia's regions are called by a variety of names; for example, Russia's 
ethnic republics are generally headed by a president, while oblasts are 
ruled by a governor and federal cities by a mayor).  
Since the mid-1990s until the end of 2004, these governors have been 
publicly elected in their respective region (with the 1996/1997 election 
cycle being the first time that direct gubernatorial elections were held 
throughout all of Russia's regions). The validity of these elections has 
been disputed, with some authors arguing that incumbent governors 
                                                          
16 Under Putin, a number of regions have since been merged into larger units, so that the 
Russian Federation today is composed out of 83 federal subjects.   
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extensively used administrative resources and political machines to 
manipulate election results in their favour (Hale 2003). Still, others have 
found that the need to hold gubernatorial elections played an 
important role in keeping governors accountable to their electorate 
(Konitzer 2006), and that sometimes regional legislatures played a 
significant part in keeping gubernatorial elections competitive (Bilev 
2011). Having a look at the data also shows that despite the apparent 
advantages held by incumbents, gubernatorial turnover and the 
number of incumbents losing an election has been substantial between 
the late 1990s and 2004 (see figure 2.1, section 2.4). 
The fact of being publicly elected, as well as the pivotal position 
governors occupied as arbiters between regional and federal interests, 
made them into powerful players in Russian politics. In several 
instances, governors were the driving force to push regional autonomy 
ahead, as for example in the case of Sverdlovsk governor Eduard 
Rossel, who campaigned for the establishment of an autonomous 
“Urals Republic” in his region (Easter 1997). They also played an 
important role on the federal level, as from 1996 onwards governors 
were automatically guaranteed ex offico membership in the upper 
chamber of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council (Ross 2010). 
Finally, governors also played an important economic role in their 
regions, as their position permitted them to conduct, participate in and 
benefit from the extensive economic restructuring that took place 
during the 1990s in Russia (Stoner-Weiss 2002, Hale 2003).  
When Vladimir Putin came to power, one of his stated objectives was to 
reconsolidate the federal state, and to re-establish the so-called “vertical 
of power”. Shortly after coming to office, he introduced a series of 
measures to curtail the power of regional governors. From 2000 
onwards, governors were no longer automatically members of the 
Federation Council. 7 federal districts were formed to increase the 
direct oversight of the presidential administration over regional 
governors, and regional laws and charters (often favouring specific 
regions) were streamlined and brought into conformity with federal 
law. A new tax code rendered even donor regions dependent upon 
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federal transfers, and regional political parties - often serving as 
electoral vehicles for the governors - were eliminated (Goode 2007, 
page 373). At the same time, big business corporations, often with the 
implicit approval of the presidential administration, were also moving 
increasingly into the regions, challenging the economic control 
acquired by regional governors during the late 1990s (Orttung 2004, 
Zubarevich 2005). For instance, during the early 2000s, big corporations 
played an important role as sponsors of corporate raiding attacks 
throughout Russia's regions, attacking and absorbing smaller firms to 
complete and consolidate their economic holdings (see chapter 3 
below). 
Still, during Putin's first term as president (2000-2004), the Kremlin 
failed to decisively gain back control over the regions. For instance, in 
several cases Kremlin-backed candidates lost regional elections against 
incumbents who had built political machines that were sufficiently 
strong to prevail against the federal centre (Chebankova 2005, pages 
941-942).  
Many observers thus see the Beslan tragedy as a pretext used by the 
presidential administration to introduce a final decisive move against 
regional governors, with the introduction of the reform abolishing 
gubernatorial elections. Goode (2007, page 374) notes that “the 
governors greatest remaining resource by the start of Putin's second 
term was their elected status”. He also points out that Putin's team 
produced a draft law on gubernatorial reform a mere two weeks after 
the Beslan incident, indicating that such a law had been in preparation 
for some time (Goode 2007, page 366). Goode then moves on to ask 
why governors mounted so little resistance against the reform, in 
contrast to earlier similar attempts by the Kremlin that had been 
vehemently opposed. 
This is indeed a good question, as just after the introduction of the 
reform a large majority of governors publicly endorsed the new law, by 
asking the president to confirm their position as governor, even though 
by the new law they could not legally be sacked until the end of their 
terms in office. Goode explains this lack of public opposition by a 
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change in the way Putin's regime was perceived by political actors in 
Russia. By 2005, most political actors in the country had accepted that 
Putin's regime was there to stay. They thus no longer tried to challenge 
or change the system, but started looking and competing for positions 
within the system. In this respect, for many governors it suddenly 
seemed easier to secure their position by demonstrating political 
loyalty to the president, instead of relying on an insecure and moody 
electorate. Indeed, in a context where regional gubernatorial elections 
had often been tainted by allegations of widespread electoral fraud, for 
many governors being appointed by the most powerful figure in the 
nation might have started to look like an enhancement of their personal 
legitimacy, rather than a loss of authority (Goode 2007, pages 376-377). 
In order not to scare regional governors and to inadvertently provoke 
resistance where none had existed in the first place, during the years 
2005 and 2006 the Kremlin refrained from firing any of the governors 
that had appealed to the president for a confirmation of their position 
(Turovsky 2010). It was only in 2007 that the presidential 
administration started in earnest to replace incumbent governors and 
to appoint its own candidates, with the president refusing to express 
his confidence in Sakhalin governor Ivan Malakhov in August 2007 
being the first incident (Turovsky 2010, page 60; see also table 2.1, 
section 2.4). 
It is probably no coincidence that the Kremlin started using the 
possibility to appoint and fire regional governors at the beginning of 
the 2007/2008 election cycle. Several factors contributed to a climate of 
uncertainty during the year 2007. Until early December, it was unclear 
who would succeed Vladimir Putin as president of the country, and 
evidence for considerable infighting among rival Kremlin factions 
became visible17. Simultaneously, genuine fears of a 'coloured 
                                                          
17 In October 2007, Viktor Cherkesov, head of the Federal Drug Control Service and also 
head of an influential Kremlin faction, published an open letter in the newspaper 
Kommersant, warning that rival security factions were about to clash about questions of 
Putin's succession (see e.g. an article published in The Moscow Times in December 2007, 
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revolution' seem to have existed among the Kremlin leadership 
(Duncan 2013), so that a strong showing of the Kremlin party United 
Russia in the 2007 Duma elections probably appeared to be of special 
urgency to the ruling elites. In this context, it seems likely that the 
Kremlin used all means available to incentivize local elites and 
administrations to assure a high turnover and high results for the 
Kremlin party in the 2007 Duma elections, as well as for the Kremlin 
candidate in the 2008 presidential elections (that Dmitry Medvedev 
would be this candidate was announced on December 10th, 2007). That 
this is indeed what happened has been argued by a range of studies 
(see e.g. Tkacheva 2008, Myagkov et al. 2009, Reisinger and Moraski 
2009, Bacon 2012). 
How exactly regional governors might use their position to deliver 
high election turnout and electoral support for the federal centre has 
been documented by Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi (2012). Using survey 
data of employers and workers from the 2011 parliamentary elections 
in Russia, they found that about a quarter of employers in the sample 
actively tried to influence the voting decision of their employees. They 
cite the symptomatic story of the mayor of Novokuznetsk, a large 
industrial city in Siberia, addressing a gathering of company directors, 
inciting them to encourage their workers to vote for United Russia. 
During his speech, the mayor explicitly mentions the regional 
governor:  
“We need to carry out these elections in the proper manner so it won’t 
be painful or uncomfortable. You are all smart people; you are all 
directors. You saw the recent United Russia congress; you saw that, on 
Friday, the governor gathered a team to discuss preparations for the 
parliamentary elections on December 4. It’s clear to everyone that 
United Russia should win.” (Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi, 2012, page 
11)18. 
                                                                                                                               
describing the infighting between two rival Kremlin factions; Siloviki Clash in Storchak 
Affair, The Moscow Times, December 7th, 2007). 
18 The whole speech can be watched on youtube (accessed on March 24th, 2013), 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kD4W5zAKlCg&feature. 
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The story nicely demonstrates how the chain of command goes from 
the federal centre to the regional governor, and from there to local 
officials such as the mayors of major towns, who in turn encourage 
local employers to do their share in achieving expected election results. 
Frye et al. then also show that large and state-owned firms, as well as 
firms with immobile assets, firms that sell to the state, and firms that 
provide their employees with significant non-wage benefits and hire in 
slack labour markets are especially likely to mobilize their employees 
(as these firms do both depend more on the state and are better able to 
exert pressure on their employees). 
Apart from using employers, regional governors are also encouraged to 
serve as poster-candidates in Duma elections. According to Tkacheva 
(2008), during the 2007 Duma elections 65 governors headed their 
regional United Russia party list, but only one subsequently accepted 
his Duma mandate. Tkacheva then also outlines further possibilities of 
regional governors to influence election results. As governors control 
the Regional Election Commissions, they can use this control to 
increase the cost of entry for opposition parties during the obligatory 
registration phase. During the campaign, a governor can decide which 
parties are allowed to post information material in public places and on 
public transport. She or he can enlist public sector employees to 
distribute campaign materials, provide timely information about social 
and business events in a region to candidates of the government party, 
as well as slow down the campaign of opposition parties by sending in 
the tax police or fire inspection to their local campaign offices. During 
election day, a governor can staff polling stations with loyal 
bureaucrats, who have strong incentives to inflate both voter turnout 
and the vote share of the ruling party, as they are in direct competition 
with other polling stations in their city and region (Tkacheva 2008, 
pages 4 and 5).  
We thus end up with an environment where the regional governor has 
a multitude of possibilities to deliver a high vote share for the ruling 
party during national elections. As a regional governor is in direct 
competition with governors in other regions, and as the Kremlin knows 
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about previous voting results in a given region, it is also relatively easy 
for the presidential administration to monitor to what extent a 
governor actually delivers high levels of turnout and a high vote share 
for United Russia. Finally, with the help of gubernatorial appointments, 
the Kremlin has since 2005 a method at hand to actively discipline 
governors who do not deliver. In other words, given the substantial 
interests the Kremlin has in achieving specific election outcomes, it is 
very likely that election results are one of the main criteria determining 
appointment decisions of regional governors by the president.  
This is indeed what has been argued and found by a range of studies 
(see Wegren and Konitzer 2007, Sharafutdinova 2010 or Turovsky 2010 
for a descriptive analysis). For instance, using data of gubernatorial 
appointments between 2005 and 2010, Reuter and Robertson (2011) find 
that the 2007 Duma election vote share for United Russia has a positive 
effect on gubernatorial appointments. Similarly, Reisinger and Moraski 
(2011), using survival analysis and data for 2005 to 2011, find that 
governors in regions with strong support for the ruling party in federal 
elections face a reduced hazard of losing office.  
In this paper, I find similar results. However, disaggregating the period 
of presidential appointments between the years 2005 and 2006, when 
the Kremlin just indiscriminately reappointed every governor that 
applied for reappointment, and the period 2007-2012, when the 
Kremlin started to fire selected candidates and appoint its own 
candidates in earnest, permits to show just how significantly 
appointment criteria changed between both periods. While election 
results of the 2003/2004 election cycle had actually a significant and 
negative effect on appointments during the years 2005 and 2006, from 
2007 onwards election results have a significant and positive effect on 
reappointments (see section 2.5). 
In contrast to election results, economic performance and social 
outcomes appear to be of no importance in determining appointment 
decisions from 2007 onwards. This is especially striking as during the 
debate around the 2004 reform, one argument in favour of the reform 
was that in the future, governors could focus much more than before 
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on regional economic development, as they no longer had to care about 
specific interest groups and elections. For example, Moscow mayor 
Yuri Luzhkov noted in 2004, in support of the reform, “that a governor 
should be concerned with the regional economy first and foremost, 
acting as a manager first, and to a lesser degree as a politician” (Goode 
2007, page 373). 
In theory, the reform indeed made the Russian system much more like 
the Chinese one, as personnel control was now centralized, while 
governors still had a lot of leeway to economically manage their 
regions. Thus, at least theoretically and using the right appointment 
criteria, the Kremlin could have used the new system to boost regional 
economic growth, by creating a strong pro-growth incentive climate. 
However, I find that from 2007 onwards, while the yearly growth rate 
of gross regional product has a negative but insignificant effect on 
appointments, the personal economic performance of a governor (see 
section 2.3 for details on how the indicator is constructed) has a 
significant and negative effect on the probability of a governor to 
remain in office.  
Above, we have seen a first description of how the system of centre-
region relations and the incentives faced by regional governors 
changed after the introduction of the 2004 reform. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 
will now present the methodology and data used in this study, before a 
detailed discussion and interpretation of the regression results will be 
held in section 2.5. 
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2.3 Econometric Specification 
 
As the stated objective of the 2004 reform was to enhance federal 
control over the regions in order to produce better social and security-
related outcomes, the first hypothesis I want to test is how much the 
economic performance of a governor plays a role in determining his 
probability of staying in office, both under the electoral and the 
appointment regime. I then also add a number of additional variables 
to control for social outcomes, such as regional levels of crime, 
unemployment and inflation, as well as an indicator for the quality of 
regional infrastructure. 
The second hypothesis to test is to what extent the political loyalty of a 
governor matters for her or him to remain in office or to be 
reappointed. Following the discussion in section 2.2, I define political 
loyalty as the ability of a governor to deliver political support for the 
ruling elites in the federal centre, in the form of high election results in 
Duma and presidential elections in his region. 
In order to be able to compare incentives faced by regional officials in 
Russia and China, the empirical strategy I use in this paper is kept 
similar to the one introduced by Li and Zhou (2005, page 1748). I 
employ an ordered probit model to examine the probability of a 
regional governor being re-elected, re-appointed or dismissed.  
Suppose that the regional electorate (from 1999 to 2004) as well as the 
Russian president (from 2005 to 2012) base their decisions on an 
evaluation score y*, which they form every year after observing and 
evaluating a number of performance criteria for each governor. While 
y* is known to the regional electorate or the Russian president, we do 
not observe the score. We only observe if a provincial governor loses or 
wins an election, or is dismissed or reappointed. In other words, we 
observe the variable y, which is 0 for a governor losing an election or 
being dismissed, 1 for a governor remaining in office or being 
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appointed or elected for the first time, and 2 for a governor being re-
elected by the regional electorate or re-appointed by the president19. 
Now assume that the latent evaluation score y* is a linear function of a 
number of independent variables x, i.e. y* = xβ + ε, where β is a vector 
of coefficients, and ε is assumed to follow a standard normal 
distribution. We now define    and    as the two cut-off points of y*, on 
which the decisions to re-elect or re-appoint a governor are based on. In 
other words, a governor loses an election or is dismissed by the 
president (y=0) if y* ≤   , stays in office (y=1) if    < y* ≤   , and is re-
elected or reappointed (y=2) if y* >    (see Li and Zhou 2005, page 
1748). 
Following Wooldridge (2002, chapter 15), the ordered probit model can 
then be expressed as 
 
 Prob(yi = 0|x) = Φ(   – xβ)  
 Prob(yi = 1|x) = Φ(   – xβ) – Φ(   – xβ),  
 Prob(yi = 2|x) = 1 – Φ(   – xβ), 
 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. 
As the objective of the paper is to compare the period when governors 
were elected with the period when governors were appointed by the 
president, I use two separate regressions to analyse each period. The 
first regression looks at the period from 1999 to 2004, i.e. the 6 years 
                                                          
19 If a governor loses an election or is dismissed before July 1st in a given year, I code the 
year before as 0 (i.e. the last year the governor has been in office throughout the whole 
year), while counting the given year as the first year in office of the new governor (y=1). If 
a governor loses an election or is dismissed after July 1st in a given year, I count this as 
the last year of the governor in office (y=0), and count the next year as the first year in 
office of the new governor (y=1). 
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when Vladimir Putin was already the dominant political figure in the 
country, but when governors were still elected. The second regression 
focuses on the period when regional governors were appointed by the 
Russian president (2005 to 2012). As the federal centre started to replace 
regional governors in earnest only from 2007 onwards (Turovsky 2010, 
see also figure 1), I then also look separately on the two periods 2005 to 
2006 and 2007 to 2012. 
As described above, the main determinants of y that we are interested 
in are regional economic performance, and political loyalty of the 
governor to the federal centre. To measure regional economic 
performance, I use both the annual growth rate of regional GDP 
(growth), and the weighted average growth rate during the tenure of a 
governor as explanatory variables (av_growth).  
As we have seen in section 2.2, governors are powerful figures in their 
regions, and a competent governor might well play a significant role in 
fostering regional growth. Thus, looking at annual regional GDP 
growth seems to be a sensible criterion to judge the performance of a 
governor. However, the regional electorate or the Russian president 
might also base their decision on a longer-term evaluation of a 
governor's activity. To incorporate the effect of past performance, 
regional GDP growth weighted by the time a governor is in office 
might thus offer a more precise indicator for the personal performance 
of a governor. Again following Li and Zhou (2005, page 1755), I 
therefore create a moving average measure of the GDP growth rate 
over the time a governor is in office,  ̃ , which is defined as  
 ̃   
 
 
 ∑  
 
   
 
where T is the number of years a governor is in office up to the point of 
calculation, t is the t-th year (t = 1, 2,..., T-1, T), and    is the GDP 
growth in the year t for a region. Thus,  ̃  corresponds to an evaluation 
mechanism in which there is an annual assessment, but where the 
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assessment is based both on the past and on the current performance of 
a governor in office. 
As already mentioned in section 2.2, a good proxy for political loyalty 
is the ability of a regional governor to deliver high election results for 
the Kremlin party United Russia in Duma elections, and high results 
for the Kremlin candidate in presidential elections. The two main 
explanatory variables I use to proxy political loyalty are thus regional 
results for United Russia in Duma elections, and results for either 
Vladimir Putin or Dmitri Medvedev in presidential elections. For the 
period 1999 to 2004, I use election results in the 1999/2000 and 
2003/2004 election cycle, while for the period 2005 to 2012, I use election 
results of the 2003/2004 and 2007/2008 election cycle (duma_elec, 
pres_elec).  
I then also use an indicator developed by Dmitry Oreshkin (2007), 
which measures the degree to which election irregularities were 
noticeable in Russia's regions, and which might be used as a proxy of 
the degree that regional governors have attempted to deliver high 
election results to the centre (irregular). For the time period 1995 to 
2007, Oreshkin identifies and collects various statistics that might 
indicate possible election irregularities from the website of the Central 
Election Commission of the Russian Federation, such as an implausibly 
high or low participation rate in elections (1), an implausibly high 
number of invalid votes (2), a very high or low share of votes “against 
all”20 (3), an implausibly high vote share for a single party or candidate 
(approaching 100% in some Russian regions) (4), and a high difference 
between results in a particular voting district and results in 
neighbouring districts (5). He then aggregates these various measures 
to build an index that is ranking Russia's regions according to the 
degree that election irregularities occurred, on a scale from 1 (low level 
of irregularities) to 10000 (very high level of irregularities). For this 
study, I use the logarithm of his indicator as an additional explanatory 
variable. 
                                                          
20 Until 2006, Russian electoral ballots contained a box named “against all”, allowing the 
voter to register a protest vote against all the candidates running.   
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Apart from economic performance and political loyalty, a number of 
other criteria may also influence the election or appointment of regional 
governors. I first control for personal characteristics of regional 
governors, such as their age (age), the amount of time they have been in 
office (tenure), and their membership in the Kremlin party United 
Russia (un_rus). I also add a dummy which is 1 if the governor had no 
previous connection to the region he was appointed to, and 0 otherwise 
(central). 
I then add a number of further variables that might measure the 
performance of a governor in office, such as the percentage of 
unemployed people in a region (unemploy), the number of criminal 
cases filed per year and capita in a region (crime), the yearly regional 
level of inflation (inflation), as well as the quality of regional 
infrastructure (infrastructure). 
Finally, a set of controls for regional characteristics is also added, such 
as the log of gross regional product per head (ln_grph), a dummy that 
is equal to 1 if the region is among the 10 most important oil exporting 
regions in Russia (oil), and a measure for the percentage of the 
population that is Russian (ethnic). This last variable permits to control 
for Russia's ethnic republics, which are often characterized by a high 
percentage of non-Russians in their population, while also exhibiting 
particular high levels of electoral fraud. 
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2.4 Data 
 
This study uses data covering 206 Russian regional governors who 
served in 81 Russian regions between 1999 and 2012. Data on these 
governors have been collected from official sources, such as the official 
websites of regional governors which normally provide extensive 
biographical information, as well as from other websites such as 
Wikipedia and various Russian websites that provide biographical 
data. 
For each governor, I collected data on the dates of elections, 
appointments and terminations, as well as on their personal 
characteristics such as age, membership in the Kremlin party United 
Russia, and on the fact if a governor had any previous links to a 
province prior to becoming head of the regional administration. I 
define that a previous link to a province exists if a governor was born, 
had lived or worked for a period longer than 6 months in a given 
region, prior to being elected or appointed governor of the region. 
The dependent variable y (turnover) in this paper is a discrete variable 
that can take the values 0, 1 or 2. The first year a governor is elected or 
appointed, as well as every following year in office (apart from the year 
of a re-election, re-appointment or promotion), is coded as y=1. The 
year of a re-election, re-appointment or promotion is coded as y=2, and 
the eventual end of tenure (termination) of a regional governor is coded 
as y=0, with end of tenure being defined as the governor not being 
promoted to a higher-level position on the federal level after the end of 
his tenure.  
As being governor is usually the top-end position in a given region, 
taking on a different position in a region (i.e. not in the federal 
government or as head of a big corporation in Moscow) after the end of 
tenure is counted as a demotion (y=0). In the dataset, actual promotions 
(i.e. the governor moving on to a higher-level position after his end of 
tenure) are quite rare. For the whole dataset, only 13 out of 117 
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governors (11.1%) between 1999 and 2012 moved on to a higher level 
position after their end of tenure (y=2), while 104 governors (88.9%) 
took on a lower-level position or retired (y=0). For our study, this is 
important, as governors seem to have little outside options to get a 
better position after their job as governors. They thus face strong 
incentives to stay in office as long as possible. In other words, they have 
strong incentives to positively influence the latent evaluation score y* 
formed by the local electorate (1999-2004) or the Russian president 
(2005-2012), on which their chances of being reappointed are based. 
If a governor loses an election, is dismissed or promoted before July 1st 
in a given year, I code the year before (i.e. the last year the governor has 
been in office throughout the whole year) as 0 in the case of a 
demotion, and as 2 in case of a promotion, while counting the given 
year as the first year in office of the new governor (y=1). If a governor 
loses an election or is dismissed or promoted after July 1st in a given 
year, I count this as the last year of the governor in office (y=0 in the 
case of a demotion, or y=2 in the case of a promotion), while counting 
the next year as the first year in office of the new governor (y=1). If a 
governor dies in office (which happened 8 times during the period 
under study), I code the year as y=1. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relative frequency of terminations (y=0) and re-
elections, re-appointments and promotions (y=2) for the period from 
1999 to 2012. For the beginning of the period, the two cycles of 
gubernatorial elections that took place in 2000 and 2003/2004 are 
visible, with terminations and re-elections moving together. The high 
number of re-appointments in 2005 is due to the fact that just after the 
reform, a large number of Russian regional governors (many of whom 
had just recently won an election) asked the federal centre to confirm 
their appointment. As the Kremlin wanted to avoid early clashes after 
the reform (Turovsky 2010), all governors that asked for a confirmation 
in 2005 and 2006 got reappointed. We then see that from 2007 onwards, 
the Kremlin started actively replacing regional governors. All in all, 
from 2005 to 2011, 60 governors that had been in office prior to 2005 
were dismissed and replaced by Kremlin candidates. Of these 60 
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governors that were replaced, only three were not born or had not 
previously lived and worked in the region where they served as 
governor (5%). On average, they were 59.8 years old at the time they 
were dismissed, and 73.3% were members of United Russia. 
 
Figure 2.1: Frequency of End of Tenure and Reappointments / 
Promotions over Time 
 
 
 
On the other hand, 29 of the 83 governors (35%) that were appointed 
between 2005 and 2012 had no previous experience in the region they 
were appointed to (central=1). The average age of the governors 
appointed between 2005 and 2012 was 49.5 years when they assumed 
office, and 83% were members of United Russia. We thus see that 
governors newly appointed after 2004 were more likely to come from 
outside the region they were appointed to (see figure 2.2), i.e. the 
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Kremlin increasingly relied on outsiders and federal bureaucrats to 
impose its policies in the regions. We also see that governors appointed 
after the reform were slightly younger and a bit more likely to be a 
member of the Kremlin party United Russia than the governors they 
replaced. 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of Governors without Prior Connection to a Region 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all the variables used in this 
study. Data on regional economic growth, gross regional product per 
capita, the unemployment rate, the number of registered crimes per 
capita, oil production, the regional inflation rate and the percentage of 
the population living below the poverty line have been collected from 
the Russian Federal Statistics Service (www.gks.ru). Data on 
presidential and Duma election results in Russia's regions have been 
gathered from the Russian Central Election Commission 
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(www.cikrf.ru). The variable describing election irregularities 
(irregular), described more closely in section 3, has been obtained from 
an article by Dmitry Oreshkin, published in Novaya Gazeta in 
November 2007 (Oreshkin 2007). The number of ethnic Russians living 
in a region (ethnic) has been obtained from the website of Russia's 
national population census in 2010 (www.perepis-2010.ru). Quality of 
infrastructure in a region is measured by a yearly regional ranking, 
published by the Russian rating agency ExpertRA (www.raexpert.org), 
with a lower rank meaning better quality of infrastructure. 
 
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean St.Dev. Min Max 
turnover 1134 1.05732 0.4857 0 2 
growth 1134 0.05212 0.06058 -0.228 0.787 
av_growth 1134 0.04118 0.04076 -0.202 0.357 
pres_elec 1134 0.64123 0.12092 0.2501 0.9881 
duma_elec 1134 0.424 0.18712 0.014 0.9872 
irregular 1134 7.06649 1.17399 2.303 9.21 
age 1134 54.47531 8.10287 34 76 
tenure 1134 6.53086 4.44843 1 20 
un_rus 1134 0.53439 0.49904 0 1 
central 1134 0.10229 0.30317 0 1 
unemploy 1134 0.09394 0.06426 0 0.78 
crime 1134 0.02081 0.00695 0.0031 0.0494 
inflation 1134 0.14489 0.08133 0.014 0.672 
infrastructure 1134 41.67 24.056 1 88 
log_grp_head 1134 11.367 0.984 8.5366 14.221 
oil 1134 0.1234 0.3291 0 1 
ethnic 1134 0.77563 0.24566 0.0078 0.9727 
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2.5 Regression Results 
 
 
This section presents and discusses evidence on the impact of a series 
of performance and loyalty related variables on the turnover of 
regional governors in Russia, for the time-period 1999 to 2012. While 
section 2.5.1 looks at the period when Russia's governors were elected 
in their regions (1999-2004), section 2.5.2 looks at the time-span when 
Russia's governors were appointed by the president (2005-2012). 
Section 2.5.3 then discusses some of the economic implications of the 
results. 
 
2.5.1 Turnover under Gubernatorial Elections 
 
Table 2.2 presents the effect of regional economic growth and personal 
economic performance on gubernatorial turnover. In order to compare 
results with the study conducted by Li and Zhou (2005) on provincial 
governors in China, the regression specification in table 2.2 is kept very 
similar to the one used by Li and Zhou in their paper (the only 
difference being that Li and Zhou use an additional control for 
education of provincial governors).  
We see that for the period when governors were elected, both regional 
economic growth and regional growth weighted by the time a governor 
was in office do not seem to play a significant role in influencing the 
decisions of the regional electorate. Incentives for Russian governors 
under the electoral regime thus differ markedly from those faced by 
Chinese governors between 1978 and 1995, as in the study by Li and 
Zhou both growth indicators have a significant and positive effect on 
turnover.  
Looking on table 2.4 in the appendix, we then see that other 
performance criteria also do not seem to significantly affect the 
decisions of regional electorates (although the signs for unemployment,  
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Table 2.2: Gubernatorial Turnover and Economic Growth, Ordered 
Probit   Dependent variable: turnover (y = 0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 1% 
significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; significant results 
marked bold; governor-specific controls (age, tenure, central, United Russia), regional 
controls (log GDP per capita, % of ethnic Russian population, oil dummy), time and 
regional dummies. Performance controls (infrastructure, inflation, unemployment, crime) 
have not been included in this specification, to get as close as possible to the specification 
used by Li and Zhou (2005). 
 
 1999 - 2004 2005 – 2012 
 Elections Appointments 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 
Annual GDP growth 
-0.227 
(0.94) 
 
-0.664 
(1.39) 
 
Weighted GDP growth  
0.274 
(2.089) 
 
-0.847 
(2.057) 
Governor-specific 
controls  
yes yes yes yes 
Performance  no no no no 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes 
Time / Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 486 486 648 648 
 
 2005 - 2006 2007 – 2012 
 Appointments 
 5) 6) 7) 8) 
Annual GDP growth 
2.104 
(5.122) 
 
-1.647 
(1.531) 
 
Weighted GDP growth  
104.81*** 
(26.76) 
 
-6.879*** 
(2.658) 
Governor-specific 
controls  
yes yes yes yes 
Performance no no no no 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes 
Time / Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 162 162 486 486 
 
  
48 
 
inflation and infrastructure quality in a given region point into a 
direction which suggests that better performance is at least to a certain 
degree taken into account by the electorate). 
Table 2.3 reports the results for political loyalty. We see that election 
results for the Kremlin party and presidential candidate in national 
elections, as well as the degree to which national elections have been 
manipulated in a given region (table 2.4, appendix), have a negative 
impact on the probability of a governor to stay in office, although 
results for presidential elections are not significant. In other words, the 
worse United Russia is performing in a given region, and the less 
national elections are manipulated, the better are the chances of a 
governor to be re-elected.  
On average, regional governors thus had no incentives to campaign for 
the Kremlin candidate and party, or to try to influence election results 
into a direction that benefited the Kremlin. Possibly, this might be one 
of the reasons why the Kremlin wanted to change the system of 
gubernatorial elections to one of gubernatorial appointments. 
 
2.5.2 Turnover under Presidential Appointments 
 
 
A first look on the period when governors were appointed (2005 to 
2012, regressions 3 and 4 in tables 2.2 and 2.3, table 2.5 in the appendix) 
does not reveal a significant difference in incentives faced by 
governors, compared with the period when governors were elected. 
The two indicators for economic growth are still insignificant, although 
personal economic performance has now consistently a negative sign 
across all specifications. Presidential election results are now positive 
but not significant, whereas Duma election results are still negative but 
no longer significant. Only the degree of election irregularities has now 
become a positive and significant predictor of the probability of a 
governor to stay in office (table 2.5, appendix). 
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Table 2.3: Turnover, Growth and Political Loyalty under Elections 
(1999 - 2004) and Appointments (2005 - 2012), Ordered Probit 
Dependent variable: turnover (y=0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 1% significance level, 
** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; significant results marked bold; 
governor-specific controls (age, tenure, central, United Russia), performance controls 
(infrastructure, inflation, unemployment, crime), regional controls (log GDP per capita, % 
of ethnic Russian population, oil dummy), time and regional dummies. 
 
 1999 - 2004 2005 – 2012 
 Elections Appointments 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 
Weighted GDP growth 
-0.03 
(2.227) 
-0.213 
(2.237) 
-0.598 
(2.116) 
-0.468 
(2.068) 
Presidential elections 
-0.364 
(1.724) 
 
1.153 
(1.516) 
 
Duma elections  
-1.717* 
(0.974) 
 
-0.216 
(1.181) 
Governor  yes yes yes yes 
Performance  yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes 
Time / Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 486 486 648 648 
 
 2005 - 2006 2007 – 2012 
 Appointments 
 5) 6) 7) 8) 
Weighted GDP growth 
111.24***  
(29.46) 
111.24*** 
(29.46) 
-6.346** 
(2.713) 
-6.346** 
(2.713) 
Presidential elections 
-183.68** 
(89.09) 
 
36.08** 
(17.99) 
 
Duma elections  
-80.22** 
(38.91) 
 
28.92** 
(14.42) 
Governor  yes yes yes yes 
Performance  yes yes yes yes 
Regional controls yes yes yes yes 
Time / Region FE yes yes yes yes 
Observations 486 486 648 648 
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However, with the discussion from section 2.2 in mind, we know that 
the period from 2005 to 2012 can actually be divided into two distinct 
sub-periods. During the first two years after the reform (2005 and 2006), 
the Kremlin did not use any specific criteria to appoint or dismiss 
selected governors, but just reappointed every governor who appealed 
for presidential confirmation (Turovsky 2010).  
Conducting a separate regression for the period 2005-2006 (regressions 
5 and 6 in tables 2.2 and 2.3, table 2.6, appendix), we actually see that 
vote shares for the Kremlin candidate and party from the 2003/2004 
election cycle have now a significant and negative effect on the 
probability of a governor to stay in office, while personal economic 
performance has a significant and positive effect. Interestingly, being a 
member of United Russia also negatively affects the probability of 
being reappointed during this period (see table 2.6, appendix).  
As the Kremlin during this early post-reform period basically just re-
confirmed election results of regional gubernatorial elections that took 
place in 2003 and 2004, this can be seen as another indication that the 
election mechanism worked against the interests of the presidential 
administration (at least with respect to gubernatorial electoral support 
for the Kremlin in national elections).  
Finally, we look at the time-span when the presidential administration 
started in earnest to appoint and dismiss regional governors 
(regressions 7 and 8 in tables 2.2 and 2.3, table 2.7, appendix). For the 
period 2007 to 2012, the vote shares for the Kremlin candidate and for 
United Russia from the 2007/2008 election cycle have a strong, 
significant and positive effect on the probability of a governor to 
remain in office, as has the degree of election irregularities and 
membership in United Russia.  
A probable interpretation of this result is that governors who actively 
used their position to deliver high election results for the Kremlin 
candidate and party (using the range of methods described in section 
2.2) have been reappointed or promoted by the Kremlin, whereas 
governors who were unable or who refused to do so, as well as 
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governors who were not members of the ruling party, faced a higher 
probability of being dismissed by the president.  
In contrast to the indicators measuring political loyalty, regional 
economic growth and personal economic performance of a governor 
have both a negative sign for the period. While annual regional 
economic growth is negative but not significant, the weighted average 
growth rate for the tenure of a governor has a significant negative effect 
on the probability to stay in office. In other words, the better a region 
has performed economically under a given governor, the worse are the 
governor's chances to stay in office or to be promoted.  
We thus see that from 2007 onwards, although the institutional 
structure in Russia has become similar to the one in China (with 
personnel control being centralized, while economic management 
remains largely decentralized), the incentives faced by regional 
executives in both countries are directly opposed. 
 
2.5.3 Turnover, Incentives and Regional Economic 
Performance 
 
Assuming that it is in the interest of the Kremlin to appoint officials 
who are both politically loyal and economically competent, this paper 
thus finds evidence that a trade-off between political loyalty and 
economic performance does indeed exist. It seems that the ruling elites 
in Russia sacrifice regional economic development, at least to a certain 
degree, in order to consolidate their political control over the country. 
What might be the mechanisms driving the results we find above? 
Ideally, it would certainly be in the interest of the Kremlin to appoint 
regional officials who are both able to deliver high vote shares and high 
rates of regional economic growth. However, for a number of reasons 
achieving the first objective might it make impossible to achieve the 
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second one, thus forcing the ruling elites in the centre to choose what 
signals to send to regional governors. 
A first obvious reason is that the technologies used by regional 
governors to generate desired election outcomes have a direct negative 
effect on regional economic dynamism. Frye et al. (2012) have shown 
that regional officials extensively rely on employers to produce desired 
election results. They show that the time and effort invested by these 
firms to politically mobilize their workers are significant. This time and 
effort cannot be invested in productive activities, and thus constitutes a 
direct loss to a regional economy. 
Moreover, they also show that the firms that are able to mobilize their 
workers at lowest cost are among the least dynamic in a region. It is 
reasonable to assume that in return for the political mobilization of 
their workers, these firms receive economic support by the regional 
governor, in the form of preferential treatment, government 
procurement contracts, subsidies or tax exemptions, even though 
economically it would make sense to support other firms that have a 
higher potential to contribute to regional economic growth. Apart from 
the direct static loss, mobilizing regional employers thus might also 
have a distortionary and dynamic negative effect on a regional 
economy. 
In addition to relying on governors for mobilizing employers, we have 
also seen that the Kremlin increasingly appoints outsiders as regional 
governors to implement its policy objectives (see figure 2.2, section 2.4). 
In a recent study, Libman, Kozlov and Schultz (2012) have shown that 
these outsiders are more likely to behave in a predatory way than 
governors who stem from a given region. As outsiders mostly worked 
at high positions in the federal government prior to be appointed 
governor, they also have better chances to return to a high-level 
position in the centre when their turn as governors ends. They thus do 
not have to care as much for regional support as governors who have to 
continue their career in a given region after the end of their 
gubernatorial term, and thus face less inhibitions to act in a predatory 
way.  
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More specifically, Libman et al. (2012) find that while regions ruled by 
governors with higher outside options are characterized by more 
repressive behaviour of tax authorities, in these same regions tax 
authorities actually collect less additional revenues for the public 
budget. They explain this paradoxical finding by arguing that outsiders 
behave like 'roving bandits', in utilizing tax audits to establish control 
over regional companies, which they then use to extract private rents 
from these companies rather than revenues for the regional budget. 
Additional evidence that predatory behaviour by regional state officials 
might be linked to the need to generate high election results is found by 
the study on corporate raiding in Russia presented in chapter 3. The 
study finds that regions where more firms are stolen from their 
legitimate owners by corrupt state agencies are also characterized by 
higher voting shares for the Kremlin party and candidate in national 
elections. I argue that a sort of quid-pro-quo mechanism might exist in 
these regions, with state agencies that are able to provide a sufficiently 
high level of electoral support for the ruling elites in the centre being 
allowed to participate in a certain degree of predatory activities. 
Finally, one could also think that political loyalty in a given person 
might be negatively correlated with the ability to foster economic 
growth. This would be the argument made by Egorov and Sonin (2011), 
who maintain that rulers might want to hire loyal but mediocre 
subordinates, in order to mitigate the risk of being overthrown. 
However, in the case of Russian governors this argument does not 
seem to hold. In another recent study, Frye, Reuter and Buckley (2011) 
have examined the backgrounds of both elected and appointed Russian 
governors. They find that their backgrounds differ only to a small 
extent, and that appointed governors are actually more likely to hold a 
graduate degree, and to have some education in economics. If it is true 
that appointed governors pay less attention to economic development 
than to other objectives, this is thus most probably not caused by a lack 
of personal ability, but rather by the general incentive climate they are 
facing. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
 
In a report published in 2012, the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development notes that Russia has been lagging behind other 
emerging economies in recent years with respect to economic 
diversification and dynamism, the role played by small and medium 
firms, skill formation, business environment and the number of 
exporting firms as a share of all firms (EBRD 2012). For a couple of 
indicators such as firm entry or the dependence of the economy on 
natural resource exports, the situation has actually worsened during 
the last decade (EBRD 2012, chapters 1 and 3). 
 
This chapter provides some evidence why Russia might have lost some 
of its economic dynamism since the mid-2000s. The paper examines the 
change in incentives for Russian regional governors caused by a 
government reform in 2004, which replaced gubernatorial elections in 
Russia's regions with appointments of regional governors by the 
Russian president. I find that while under gubernatorial elections 
economic performance had an insignificant impact and political loyalty 
to the federal centre a negative impact on the probability of a governor 
to be re-elected, under presidential appointments (after an initial 
adjustment period from 2005 to 2006), economic performance had a 
negative impact on the probability of being reappointed, while political 
loyalty to the federal centre had a strong positive effect on the 
probability of a governor to be reappointed or promoted. In other 
words, since about 2007 Russian governors face strong incentives to 
demonstrate their political loyalty by delivering electoral support for 
the Kremlin, while their economic performance has actually a negative 
effect on their chances to remain in office. 
 
Since the reform in 2004, the set-up of federal institutions in Russia has 
started to resemble the federal structure introduced in China under 
Deng Xiaoping in the early 1980s. In both countries, regional governors 
are appointed by the federal centre, while they remain relatively free to 
conduct the economic policy they want in their respective regions. To 
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make the results of this study comparable with results of a similar 
study on Chinese governors by Li and Zhou (2005), the model and 
specification used in this paper have been kept as similar as possible to 
the ones introduced by Li and Zhou (2005). However, while Li and 
Zhou find that economic performance has a strong and positive effect 
on the probability of Chinese governors to remain in office or to be 
promoted, this paper finds an opposite incentive structure for Russia. 
The study thus also shows that similar institutional structures can 
produce very different outcomes, depending on the signals send by the 
federal centre and the incentive structure in place. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
56 
 
2.7 References 
 
 
[1] Alesina A., Tabellini G. (2007), Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A 
Single Policy Task, American Economic Review, 97(1), 169-179 
[2] Alesina A., Tabellini G. (2008), Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: 
Multiple Policy Tasks, Journal of Public Economics, 92(3/4), 426-447 
[3] Bacon E. (2012), Electoral Manipulation and the Development of 
Russia’s Political System, Europe-Asia Studies, 28(2), 105-118 
[4] Besley T., Coate S. (2003), Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: 
Theory and Evidence, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(5), 
1176-1206 
[5] Bilev G. (2011), 89 Russias: The Role of Formal Institutions in 
Explaining Executive Contestation, APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper 
[6] Blakkisrud (2011), Medvedev’s New Governors, Europe-Asia Studies, 
63(3), 367-395 
[7] Bo Z. (1996), Economic Performance and Political Mobility: Chinese 
Provincial Leaders, Journal of Contemporary China, 5(12), 135-154 
[8] Bo Z. (2002), Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance 
and Political Mobility since 1949, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, NY 
[9] Chebankova E. (2005), The Limitations of Central Authority in the 
Regions and the Implications for the Evolution of Russia’s Federal 
System, Europe-Asia Studies, 57(7), 933-949 
[10] Chebankova E. (2006), The Unintended Consequences of 
Gubernatorial Appointments in Russia, 2005-6, Journal of Communist 
Studies and Transition Politics, 22(4), 457-484 
  
57 
 
[11] Duncan, P. (2013), Russia, the West and the 2007-2008 Electoral 
Cycle: Did the Kremlin Really Fear a ’Coloured Revolution’ ?, Europe-
Asia Studies, 65(1), 1-25 
[12] Easter G. (1997), Redefining Centre-Regional Relations in the 
Russian Federation: Sverdlovsk Oblast, Europe-Asia Studies, 49(4), 617-
635 
[13] EBRD (2012), Diversifying Russia: Harnessing Regional Diversity, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London 
[14] Egorov G., Sonin K. (2011), Dictators and their Vizirs: 
Endogenizing the Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off, Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 9(5), 903-930 
[15] Evans P., Rauch J. (1999), Bureaucracy and Growth: A Cross-
National Analysis of the Effects of “Weberian” State Structures on 
Economic Growth, American Sociological Review, 64(5), 748-765 
[16] Frye T., Reuter O., Buckley N. (2011), The Political Economy of 
Russian Gubernatorial Election and Appointment, working paper BRP 
01/PS/2011, Higher School of Economics, Moscow 
[17] Frye T., Reuter O., Szakonyi (2012), Political Machines at Work: 
Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace, working 
paper BRP 08/PS/2012, Higher School of Economics, Moscow 
[18] Gandhi J., Lust-Okar E. (2009), Elections under Authoritarianism, 
Annual Review of Political Science, 12, 403-422 
[19] Gelman V. (2010), The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism, 
Russian Politics and Law, 48(2), 7-26 
[20] Goode J.P. (2007), The Puzzle of Putin’s Gubernatorial 
Appointments, Europe-Asia Studies, 59(3), 365-399 
  
58 
 
[21] Hale H. (2003), Explaining Machine Politics in Russia’s Regions: 
Economy, Ethnicity, and Legacy, Post-Soviet Affairs, 19(3), 228-263 
[22] Iaryczower M., Lewis G., Shum M. (2013), To Elect or to Appoint? 
Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians, 
Journal of Public Economics, 97, 230-244 
[23] Jones B., Olken B. (2005), Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership 
and Growth Since WW II, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 835-
864 
[24] Konitzer A. (2006), Voting for Russia’s Governors: Regional 
Elections and Accountability under Yeltsin and Putin, The John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore 
[25] Landry P. (2008), Decentralized Authoritarianism in China: The 
Communist Party’s Control of Local Elites in the Post-Mao Era, 
Cambridge University Press, New York 
[26] Levitsky S., Way L. (2002), The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 51-65 
[27] Li D. (1998), Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy, 
American Economic Review, 88(2), 393-397 
[28] Li H., Zhou L. (2005), Political Turnover and Economic 
Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China, Journal 
of Public Economics, 89, 1743-1762 
[29] Libman A., Kozlov V., Schultz A. (2012), Roving Bandits in Action: 
Outside Option and Governmental Predation in Autocracies, Kyklos, 
65(4), 526-562 
[30] Magaloni B. (2008), Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of 
Authoritarian Rule, Comparative Political Studies, 41(4/5), 715-741 
  
59 
 
[31] Maskin E., Tirole J. (2004), The Politician and the Judge: 
Accountability in Government, American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034-
1054 
[32] Mendras M. (1999), How Regional Elites Preserve their Power, 
Post-Soviet Affairs, 15(4), 295-311 
[33] Mendras M. (2012), Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State, 
C Hurst & Co, London 
[34] Myagkov M., Ordeshook P., Shakin D. (2009), The Forensics of 
Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge University Press, New 
York 
[35] Nye J., Vasilyeva O. (2012), Does Political Competition Matter for 
Public Goods Provision? - Evidence from Russian Regions, George 
Mason University Working Paper in Economics No. 12-55 
[36] Oreshkin D. (2007), Vybory i Geographiya Administrativogo 
Resursa [Elections and the Geography of ’Administrative Resources’], 
Geography Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences; an abridged 
version of the study was published in Novaya Gazeta, November 11th, 
2007 
[37] Orttung R. (2004), Business and Politics in the Russian Regions, 
Problems of Post-Communism, 51(2), 48-60 
[38] Reisinger W., Moraski B. (2009), Regional Voting in Russia’s 
Federal Elections and Changing Regional Deference to the Kremlin, 
conference paper, 67th Annual National Conference of the Midwest 
Political Science Association 
[39] Reisinger W., Moraski B. (2011), Skill or Loyalty? The Fate of 
Russia’s Governors Under Presidential Control, mimeo 
[40] Reuter O. (2010), The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United 
Russia and Russia’s Governors, Europe-Asia Studies, 62(2), 293-327 
  
60 
 
[41] Reuter O., Gandhi J. (2010), Economic Performance and Elite 
Defection from Hegemonic Parties, British Journal of Political Science, 
41(1), 83-110 
[42] Reuter O., Remington T. (2009), Dominant Party Regimes and the 
Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia, Comparative Political 
Studies, 42(4), 501-526 
[43] Reuter O., Robertson G. (2012), Subnational Appointments in 
Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russian Gubernatorial 
Appointments, The Journal of Politics, 74(4), 1023-1037 
[44] Reuter O., Turovsky R. (2012), Dominant Party Rule and 
Legislative Leadership in Authoritarian Regimes, , forthcoming 
[45] Ross C. (2010), Federalism and Inter-Governmental Relations in 
Russia, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 26(2), 165-187 
[46] Sharafutdinova G. (2010), Subnational Governance in Russia: How 
Putin Changed the Contract with his Agents and the Problems it 
Created for Medvedev, Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 40(4), 672-696 
[47] Shih V., Adolph C., Liu M. (2012), Getting Ahead in the 
Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee 
Members in China, American Political Science Review, 106(1), 166-187 
[48] Stoner-Weiss, K. (1999), Central Weakness and Provincial 
Autonomy: Observations on the Devolution Process in Russia, Post-
Soviet Affairs, 15(1), 87-106 
[49] Stoner-Weiss, K. (2002), Local Heroes: The Political Economy of 
Russian Regional Governance, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
[50] Svolik M. (2012), The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
  
61 
 
[51] Tkacheva O. (2008), Governors as Poster-Candidates in Russia’s 
Legislative Elections, 2003 - 2008, mimeo, University of Michigan 
[52] Turovsky R. (2010), How Russian Governors Are Appointed, 
Russian Politics and Law, 48(1), 58-79 
[53] Wagner A. (2011), Loyalty and Competence in Public Agencies, 
Public Choice, 146(1/2), 145-162 
[54] Wegren S., Konitzer A. (2007), Prospects for Managed Democracy 
in Russia, Europe-Asia Studies, 59(6), 1025-1047 
[55] Wooldridge J. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross-Section and 
Panel Data, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA 
[56] Yao Y., Zhang M. (2012), Subnational Leaders and Economic 
Growth, working paper, China Center for Economic Research, Peking 
University 
[57] Zheng S., Kahn M., Sun W., Luo D. (2012), Urban Political 
Accountability in China: Implications for Energy Efficiency and 
Pollution Levels, working paper  
[58] Zubarevich N. (2005), Big Business in Russia’s Regions and its Role 
in the Federal Reform, in Reddaway, P. and Orttung R. (eds.), The 
Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional 
Relations, vol. 2, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
62 
 
2.8 Appendix 
 
Table 2.4: Turnover and Elections, Ordered Probit, 1999 – 2004  
 
 Dependent variable: turnover (y=0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 
1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; 
significant results marked bold. 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
Annual GDP 
growth 
-0.227 
(0.94) 
    
Weighted GDP 
growth 
 0.274 
(2.089) 
-0.03 
(2.227) 
-0.213 
(2.237) 
0.056 
(2.211) 
Pres. elections 
('00 & '04) 
  -0.364 
(1.724) 
  
Duma elections 
('99 & '03) 
   -1.717* 
(0.974) 
 
Election 
irregularities 
    -1.832 
(1.188) 
Age -0.03 
(0.022) 
-0.03 
(0.023) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.031 
(0.024) 
-0.031 
(0.023) 
Tenure -0.176*** 
(0.044) 
-0.175*** 
(0.043) 
-0.174*** 
(0.045) 
-0.172*** 
(0.045) 
-0.179*** 
(0.044) 
Central -0.208 
(0.463) 
-0.221 
(0.477) 
-0.299 
(0.497) 
-0.298 
(0.499) 
-0.28 
(0.486) 
United Russia 0.28 
(0.246) 
0.283 
(0.245) 
0.284 
(0.249) 
0.286 
(0.249) 
0.224 
(0.247) 
Unemployment   -1.34 
(1.041) 
-1.159 
(1.042) 
-1.318 
(1.034) 
Crime rate   0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0004 
(0.0003) 
Inflation   -2.71 
(1.783) 
-2.749 
(1.781) 
-2.733 
(1.728) 
Infrastructure   -0.006 
(0.027) 
-0.0007 
(0.027) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.935 
(0.698) 
0.828 
(0.734) 
0.67 
(0.796) 
0.71 
(0.789) 
0.835 
(0.749) 
Ethnic 377.67* 
(219.48) 
384.96* 
(219.99) 
289.98 
(242.69) 
267.7 
(240.95) 
30.524 
(97.811) 
Oil 126.19* 
(75.35) 
128.92* 
(75.56) 
97.14 
(83.94) 
88.98 
(83.39) 
11.725 
(36.35) 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 
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Table 2.5: Turnover and Appointments, Ordered Probit, 2005 – 2012   
 
 Dependent variable: turnover (y=0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 
1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; 
significant results marked bold. 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
Weighted GDP 
growth 
-0.598 
(2.116) 
-0.468 
(2.068) 
-0.494 
(2.094) 
-0.494 
(2.094) 
-0.494 
(2.094) 
Pres. elections 
('04 & '08) 
1.153 
(1.516) 
    
Duma elections 
('03 & '07) 
 -0.216 
(1.181) 
   
Pres. elections 
(2004) 
  -34.375* 
(18.049) 
  
Duma elections 
(2003) 
   -15.013* 
(7.883) 
 
Election 
irregularities 
    1.318** 
(0.692) 
Age -0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
-0.036*** 
(0.014) 
Tenure -0.012 
(0.017) 
-0.01 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.011 
(0.017) 
Central 0.367 
(0.256) 
0.36 
(0.257) 
0.364 
(0.256) 
0.364 
(0.256) 
0.364 
(0.256) 
United Russia 0.42* 
(0.226) 
0.429* 
(0.226) 
0.425* 
(0.226) 
0.425* 
(0.226) 
0.425* 
(0.226) 
Unemployment 4.917 
(3.487) 
4.673 
(3.51) 
4.728 
(3.496) 
4.728 
(3.496) 
4.28 
(3.536) 
Crime rate 0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
Inflation 1.437 
(3.577) 
1.296 
(3.57) 
1.351 
(3.578) 
1.351 
(3.578) 
1.351 
(3.578) 
Infrastructure 0.003 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
2.161*** 
(0.639) 
2.165*** 
(0.641) 
2.159*** 
(0.64) 
2.159*** 
(0.64) 
2.159*** 
(0.64) 
Ethnic -246.8** 
(123.3) 
-248.7** 
(123.1) 
157.86 
(109.7) 
65.08 
(68.8) 
-45.27 
(47.08) 
Oil -88.53** 
(42.44) 
-88.95** 
(42.36) 
54.9 
(40.18) 
19.95 
(24.71) 
-21.95 
(17.13) 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 648 648 648 648 648 
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Table 2.6: Turnover and Appointments, Ordered Probit, 2005 – 2006 
 
 Dependent variable: turnover (y=0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 
1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; 
significant results marked bold. 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
Annual GDP 
growth 
2.104 
(5.122) 
    
Weighted GDP 
growth 
 104.81*** 
(26.76) 
111.24*** 
(29.46) 
111.24*** 
(29.46) 
111.24*** 
(29.46) 
Pres. elections 
(2004) 
  -183.68** 
(89.09) 
  
Duma elections 
(2003) 
   -80.22** 
(38.91) 
 
Election 
irregularities 
    7.043** 
(3.416) 
Age -0.243*** 
(0.061) 
-0.519*** 
(0.084) 
-0.556*** 
(0.092) 
-0.556*** 
(0.092) 
-0.556*** 
(0.092) 
Tenure -0.142 
(0.098) 
0.352*** 
(0.11) 
0.374*** 
(0.135) 
0.374*** 
(0.135) 
0.374*** 
(0.135) 
Central 8.749*** 
(0.707) 
5.471*** 
(1.289) 
5.284*** 
(1.576) 
5.284*** 
(1.576) 
5.284*** 
(1.576) 
United Russia -1.113 
(0.7) 
-1.473** 
(0.592) 
-1.485** 
(0.734) 
-1.485** 
(0.734) 
-1.485** 
(0.734) 
Unemployment   -11.43 
(21.1) 
-11.43 
(21.1) 
-11.43 
(21.1) 
Crime rate   -0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
-0.0005 
(0.001) 
Inflation   14.66 
(9.88) 
14.66 
(9.88) 
14.66 
(9.88) 
Infrastructure   0.021 
(0.048) 
0.021 
(0.048) 
0.021 
(0.048) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
1.014 
(5.979) 
-3.086 
(6.592) 
-2.001 
(5.381) 
-2.001 
(5.381) 
-2.001 
(5.381) 
Ethnic 2.519 
(713.1) 
-959.1 
(685.6) 
980.5*** 
(368.7) 
179.23** 
(71.35) 
-104.85 
(254.79) 
Oil -0.238 
(256.3) 
-319.5 
(247.6) 
365.88*** 
(137.44) 
484.78*** 
(186.46) 
-44.68 
(100.83) 
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 162 162 162 162 162 
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Table 2.7: Turnover and Appointments, Ordered Probit, 2007 – 2012  
 
 Dependent variable: turnover (y=0, 1, 2); robust standard errors; *** 
1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level; 
significant results marked bold. 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 
Annual GDP 
growth 
-1.647 
(1.531) 
    
Weighted GDP 
growth 
 -6.879*** 
(2.658) 
-6.346** 
(2.713) 
-6.346** 
(2.713) 
-6.346** 
(2.713) 
Pres. elections 
(2008) 
  36.08** 
(17.99) 
  
Duma elections 
(2007) 
   28.92** 
(14.42) 
 
Election 
irregularities 
    1.667** 
(0.831) 
Age -0.022 
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.0197) 
-0.021 
(0.0197) 
-0.021 
(0.0197) 
Tenure -0.056** 
(0.022) 
-0.052** 
(0.023) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
Central 0.426 
(0.337) 
0.394 
(0.333) 
0.384 
(0.328) 
0.384 
(0.328) 
0.384 
(0.328) 
United Russia 0.722** 
(0.306) 
0.658** 
(0.307) 
0.689** 
(0.309) 
0.689** 
(0.309) 
0.689** 
(0.309) 
Unemployment   5.887 
(4.686) 
5.887 
(4.686) 
5.887 
(4.686) 
Crime rate   -0.00006 
(0.0005) 
-0.00006 
(0.0005) 
-0.00006 
(0.0005) 
Inflation   -2.65 
(4.796) 
-2.65 
(4.796) 
-2.65 
(4.796) 
Infrastructure   -0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
2.874** 
(1.13) 
2.989*** 
(1.097) 
3.126*** 
(1.101) 
3.126*** 
(1.101) 
3.126*** 
(1.101) 
Ethnic -245.04 
(152.0) 
-261.1* 
(147.4) 
-32.54 
(71.6) 
-54.48 
(77.68) 
16.53 
(62.99) 
Oil -89.106* 
(52.75) 
-94.5* 
(51.2) 
-23.6 
(27.6) 
-31.381 
(30.05) 
-2.8 
(23.12) 
Time FE yes yes yes yes Yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 
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Chapter 3 
Corporate Raiding and the Role of the 
State in Russia 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Imagine being a young innovative entrepreneur in Russia. A couple of 
years ago, you had a brilliant idea, you were able to get some money, 
which permitted you to start a business. The business began to grow, 
with your company eventually becoming one of the leaders in its field. 
Until one morning, access to your office is denied by a group of armed 
people in black uniforms. A sleek lawyer presents you with a 
document stating that you no longer own your business. The document 
is evidently a forgery, but it contains the official seal of a local judge. 
You call the police, but after viewing the document an officer confirms 
that the document is legal. The officer then asks you to kindly leave the 
company premises, as you no longer own the firm. Outraged, you start 
a legal battle to get your business back. But procedures are long and 
protracted, and although finally a court acknowledges that the 
document was indeed a forgery, in the meantime your company has 
been dismantled, its assets sold off, and the group carrying out the raid 
has disappeared. Although you are still young and innovative, you will 
now think twice before starting a new business. 
During the last 15 years, this has been a common situation for many 
Russian entrepreneurs. While only a couple of high-profile cases have 
made it into the Western press, inside Russia the problem of corporate 
raiding (reiderstvo) has received widespread attention. The issue has 
been widely discussed in regional and national Russian newspapers, as 
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well as in the popular media, with numerous novels, TV series and 
movies about raiding being published and produced in recent years21. 
Leading observers of the Russian economy have underlined its 
importance, with Elena Zhuravskaya (2008, page 2) calling corporate 
raiding “the problem most acute, urgent and illustrative of the present 
state of affairs” in Russia today. 
Corporate raiding in Russia is a distinctive phenomenon, not to be 
confounded with hostile takeovers elsewhere. Unlike hostile takeovers 
in the West, corporate raids in Russia are characterised by the use of 
illegal methods, such as blackmail, bribery, forged documents, and the 
use of armed groups to enforce change of ownership. A further central 
point is the close involvement of corrupt government agencies, both as 
active supporters of raider groups, and as initiators of raiding attacks 
themselves. From an economic perspective, most observers agree that 
the economic effects of corporate raiding in Russia are negative, in 
contrast to the often efficiency-enhancing effects of takeovers elsewhere 
in the world. In Russia, the story goes, firms are attacked and taken 
over not for productive purposes, but for short-term profits, with 
companies being dismantled and assets sold off after a raid has been 
successfully carried out. Apart from the direct negative effects on 
attacked companies, this also contributes to a negative business climate 
in general. If entrepreneurs have to fear that their firm is stolen once 
they are successful, they are less inclined to start a business and to 
invest in the first place. 
Corporate raiding is the latest distinctive stage in the history of the 
fight for property in Russia's economic transition. Volkov (2004) 
identifies three different stages of property re-distribution before 1998. 
After covert insider privatization threatened to get out of hand (1988-
1991), the reformers initiated privatization by vouchers (1992-1994), 
which was then followed by the infamous loans-for-shares schemes 
                                                          
21 For example, Ochota na Isubrja (1999) and Promsona (2003) by Yulia Latynina, Reider 
(2007) by Pavel Astachov, or Anti-Reider (2008) and Millioner (2010) by Sergei Sergeyev. 
Ochota na Isubrja, about the takeover of a steel plant in Siberia, was made into a TV series 
in 2005, and Reider into a movie in 2011. 
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around the time of Boris Yeltsin's re-election (1995-1996). By 1997, the 
Russian state had privatized a large percentage of its assets, which had 
been acquired mostly by insiders and a small group of profiteers that 
smartly navigated the different stages of privatization, the so-called 
oligarchs (Barnes 2006). 
Facilitated by a change in Russia’s bankruptcy law in 1998, it was at 
this point that corporate raiding started in Russia (Volkov 2004, 
Radygin 2010). Those who had been left outside until now started 
trying to get a share of the pie, while some of the leading oligarchs tried 
to consolidate and round-up their possessions with the use of illegal 
takeover attacks. Increasingly, various state-agencies then also started 
to participate in the fight for property, first as facilitators of raiding 
attacks, and then by grabbing attractive assets out of their own 
initiative. Although the methods, characteristics and main protagonists 
of raiding attacks have changed over time, since the late 1990s until 
today corporate raiding has remained a central feature of corporate 
conflict and state-business relations in Russia. 
Considering the central importance of the topic to understand Russia's 
economy during the 2000s, its treatment in the literature has remained 
relatively limited to date. A number of descriptive studies provide an 
overall account of raiding in Russia. Volkov (2004), Firestone (2008), 
Zhuravskaya (2008), Carbonell (2009), Settles (2009), Sakwa (2011) and 
Osipian (2012) focus on a couple of high-profile cases to highlight the 
characteristics, methods, determinants and economic consequences of 
raiding attacks. Kireev (2007) and Radygin (2010) look more specifically 
on the market for corporate control in Russia, while Woodruff (2004) 
and Firestone (2010) examine the legal side of the problem. Demidova 
(2007) and Markus (2012) look on preventive measures and possible 
defenses against raiding, whereas Kapeliushnikov et al. (2012) and 
Dzarasov (2011) try to quantitatively measure the economic effects of 
insecure property rights in Russia. Finally, Privalov and Volkov (2007), 
Aldabergenova (2010), Volkov et al. (2010), Gans-Morse (2012) and 
Yakovlev, Baranov and Nazrullaeva (2013) look on the involvement of 
state agencies and the role of the state. 
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While these studies provide important insights, a number of central 
questions have not yet been addressed. Although there is a general 
consensus that corporate raiding has been a major problem of the 
Russian economy in the 2000s, estimates about the actual extent of the 
phenomenon vary widely (see table 3.3, appendix). Most estimates 
cited in the literature are subjective evaluations made by officials and 
experts in newspaper interviews. Apart from a short study by Zhang 
(2010)22, there is no quantitative evidence about the real number of 
raider attacks or about a possible evolution in the number of cases over 
time. While there seems to be a consensus in the literature that the 
number of attacks per year might easily be situated in the hundreds or 
even thousands, no solid evidence for this exists. As there has been a 
recent tendency in the Russian media to call all types of corporate 
conflict in Russia “reiderstvo” (Sakwa 2011), the actual number of 
attacks might also be lower than expected. 
Evidence about the nature and characteristics of the firms attacked, the 
raiders themselves, the prevalence of raiding in different regions and 
the extent to which state agencies are involved remains also largely 
anecdotal to date. While a handful of cases have been widely covered, a 
genuine understanding of the phenomenon of corporate raiding would 
require an analysis based on a broader sample. Such a sample would 
also permit to have a look at the deeper determinants of reiderstvo in 
Russia, especially with respect to the growing role played by regional 
state agencies and the central state. 
In this paper, I attempt to provide an analysis based on a broader 
sample of cases. As official information about corporate raiding in 
Russia does either not exist, or is not publicly available, I base my study 
on a comprehensive search for cases that have been mentioned in 
Russian newspaper articles. Using the online-archive Integrum23, a strict 
definition of corporate raiding, and looking for at least two 
                                                          
22 Zhang, using a number of different sources, assembles a sample of 97 major takeover 
cases between 1992 and 2005. 
23 A database containing all national and regional newspapers in Russia, 
www.integrum.ru.  
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independent sources per case, I was able to compile a new dataset of 
312 cases that have occurred between 1999 and 2010. 
The dataset permits a more in-depth treatment of the topic than has 
previously been possible. I am able to identify a shift over time both in 
the regions and in the sectors affected by raiding attacks. The dataset 
also permits to show that corrupt state agencies have indeed become 
increasingly involved in the illegal grabbing of economic assets, 
especially from the year 2003 onwards. 
Having more substantive evidence for the increasing involvement of 
state agencies makes it possible to place this study into the wider 
literature on predatory state agencies in transition economies and 
authoritarian regimes. In a classic paper, Frye and Shleifer (1997) 
describe how government agencies in transition countries might act 
with a grabbing, helping or invisible hand. In another classic study, 
Olson (1993) distinguishes between roving and stationary bandits, 
arguing that a ruler with some attachment to a given territory will be 
less inclined to act in a predatory way. Libman, Kozlov and Schultz 
(2012) apply this framework to Russia, showing empirically that 
governors with no prior links to a given region are more likely to act in 
a predatory way, by increasing the repressiveness of regional tax 
agencies in order to collect private rents.    
Furthermore, the study also relates to the literature on patron-client 
and principal-agent relationships in authoritarian regimes (see e.g. 
Egorov and Sonin 2011), the literature on electoral authoritarian 
regimes (Gandhi and Lust-Oskar 2009; Frye, Reuter, Szakonyi 2011), as 
well as to the literature on potential political loyalty – economic 
performance trade-offs in such contexts (see e.g. Reisinger and Moraski 
2011, and chapter 2 above). 
Building on this literature, I try to examine in the second part of this 
chapter why state-agencies in Russia have become increasingly 
involved in illegal corporate raiding activities over time. Using a fixed-
effects panel model to look at the determinants of raiding attacks in 
Russian regions, I find that election results for the Kremlin party 
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United Russia in Duma elections and for the Kremlin candidate in 
presidential elections, as well as the degree to which elections have 
been manipulated in Russia’s regions, are significantly and positively 
correlated with the number of raiding attacks in a given region. On the 
other hand, various indicators measuring the attachment of a regional 
governor to his or her region are negative predictors of the number of 
raiding attacks that took place in the region. 
In chapter 2, I have presented evidence that a trade-off between 
economic performance and political loyalty might exist in Russia, from 
the time on when regional governors were appointed by the president. 
Based on the results found in this study, I now develop this line of 
thought further. I now argue that a kind of quid-pro-quo mechanism 
might have formed itself in Russian regions, especially from the time 
when regional administrations were directly appointed by the 
presidential administration (i.e. when they were no longer accountable 
to the regional electorate). Thus, as long as regional state agencies are 
able to provide a sufficiently high level of electoral support for the 
ruling elites in the centre, it is conceivable that the central state might in 
turn tolerate a certain degree of predatory activities by regional elites.  
My results present additional evidence confirming the results obtained 
by Libman, Kozlov and Schultz (2012), in showing that regions with 
governors that have stronger ties to their region are characterized by a 
lower level of predatory activities by local state agencies. The results 
also fit and illustrate the argument advanced by Olson (1993) about 
stationary and roving bandits. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the dataset and 
the methodology used for data collection. Section 3 describes more in 
detail the phenomenon of corporate raiding in Russia, and looks on the 
distribution of attacks across time, regions and sectors. Section 4 
presents the econometric specification, section 5 the regression results, 
and section 6 concludes. 
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3.2 Data 
 
Until the introduction of a federal law on corporate raiding in July 
201024, no official statistics on raiding did exist in Russia. In the 
comparatively rare cases that raiders were convicted, this was done 
under standard corporate law, making it difficult to distinguish raiding 
cases from other cases in criminal statistics. Estimates about the overall 
number of cases that are cited in the literature are mostly based on the 
subjective opinion of experts, politicians and officials, and vary widely 
(see table 3.3, appendix). To my knowledge, no reliable aggregate 
information exists to date about the number of raiding attacks carried 
out each year in Russia, and their regional distribution. 
The only available information that I am aware of is information 
present in news reports and newspaper articles about raiding attacks. 
In this study, I therefore undertake a systematic analysis of Russian 
newspaper archives, to assemble a dataset about raiding that is as 
complete, representative and random as possible, given the limitations 
on data availability described above.    
To access newspaper archives, I used the online database “Integrum” 
(www.integrum.ru), a comprehensive database of all Russian national 
and regional newspapers archives (2441 different media in total). I 
searched the archives with the use of different keywords for articles 
about illegal corporate takeovers and raider attacks25, ending the search 
when no new relevant articles appeared for each keyword. For each 
reference to an attack, I checked if the attack was compatible with a 
strict definition of illegal corporate raiding. A case was only added to 
                                                          
24 Composed of a number of amendments and extensions to existing law, i.a. to Federal 
Law No. 147-FZ, “On Natural Monopolies”. 
25 Keywords used are reider, reiderstvo, reiderskii sachvat, korporativnii sachvat, 
nedrushestvenoe poglashenie, peredel sobstvennosti, sakasenoe bankrotstvo, i.e. raider, 
raider attack, raider takeover, corporate takeover, hostile takeover, property 
redistribution, ordered bankruptcy. Archives were accessed between November 2011 and 
February 2012. 
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the dataset if two independent sources clearly confirmed that illegal 
methods (e.g. blackmail, bribery, forged documents or the use of 
physical force through armed groups or bribed police officers) were 
used in an attempted or successful attack on a given firm. The objective 
of the attack had to be a partial or complete transfer of property from 
the initial owners to the attackers. Moreover, the information also had 
to be detailed enough to permit the clear identification of the year the 
attack occurred, of the firm attacked, and of the attack's precise 
location. 
Altogether, I was able to identify 312 cases of corporate raiding for the 
period 1999 to 2010, based on evidence from approximately 1500 
newspaper articles. For each case, I checked if the illegal involvement 
of state agencies was mentioned, either in support of raiders, or as 
initiators of the raid themselves. If state-involvement was mentioned, I 
grouped it according to five categories, i.e. involvement by the security 
services, the tax service, courts and the legal system, any kind of 
regulatory control agency (e.g. fire security), and local and regional 
administrations. Finally, I also retrieved financial and corporate 
information for each attacked company from the company database 
ORBIS (copyright BvD). This was done to get some idea about the size, 
type and importance of target companies. Detailed corporate 
information was available for 216 of the 312 firms in my sample. 
It is obvious that information collected from newspaper archives comes 
with a number of shortcomings. On the one hand, only a limited 
number of cases might find their way into newspapers, as raiders are 
inclined to keep their activity secret, and local officials might try to 
prevent the publication of incriminating information. Furthermore, 
reporting on economic crimes is inherently risky, especially in a 
country like Russia where 106 journalists have been murdered between 
1999 and 201026. Thus, it is quite possible that the real number of cases 
is a multiple of the number of cases that can be found in the press. 
                                                          
26 “Journalists in Russia” database, http://journalists-in-russia.org/.  
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On the other hand, attacked businessmen have increasingly tried to 
make their cases public, as part of a strategy of defense. In addition, a 
number of local business associations27 have started to publicize 
information about raider attacks and about the predatory behaviour of 
state agencies. While this might imply that information on raider 
attacks in the press is favourably biased towards the interests of 
attacked entrepreneurs, it at least means that information is made 
available at all.  
While not fully free, the Russian print media is still more independent 
than the televised media in the country, with a number of regional and 
national newspapers actively discussing sensitive issues. Looking at a 
frequency analysis of mentions in all Russian national and regional 
newspapers, it seems that at least from 2004 onwards, the issue of 
corporate raiding has been relatively widely discussed in the Russian 
press.  
Figure 3.1 shows that while the number of times terms such as 
“organized crime” and “property redistribution” (characteristic for 
Russia in the 1990s) were mentioned remained stable throughout the 
2000s, the number of mentions for terms such as “corporate raiding”, 
“corruption” and “siloviki” (“silovik” being a Russian word used to 
describe politicians from the security and military services, with a large 
proportion of Vladimir Putin's close associates being siloviki28) 
increased significantly during the same period. Apart from showing 
that newspapers in Russia do discuss the issue of corporate raiding, the 
simultaneous increase in newspaper mentions for “siloviki”, 
“corruption” and a bit later “raider attack” also suggests that both 
issues might be somehow connected. 
 
                                                          
27 An example is the NGO “Business Solidarity” (Бизнес Солидарность), founded by 
entrepreneur Yana Yakovlevna (www.kapitalisty.ru).   
28 See e.g. Kryshtanovskaya and White (2003, 2009). 
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Figure 3.1: Terms mentioned in Russian national and regional 
newspapers (number of mentions / year; source: Integrum, www.integrum.ru) 
 
 
An obvious problem concerning newspaper reports on economic crime 
in Russia is the possibility that newspaper articles might have been 
bought or fabricated by one party to attack or slander a competitor or 
opponent. I try to address this issue in reporting a case only if at least 
two independent sources describe the same attack.  
However, as the ownership and control structure of Russian 
newspapers (especially of regional newspapers) is very opaque, this 
remains a serious problem, as it is very difficult to determine if two 
different newspapers are indeed independent. I therefore tried to apply 
common sense in deciding whether a reported case indeed describes an 
attack, or whether the description could have been fabricated to harm a 
specific party.   
A final issue concerning data quality is the risk of information being 
geographically biased, as the likelihood of newspapers reporting 
raiding attacks might differ from region to region. In the empirical part 
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of this study, I try to address this problem by including a control for the 
degree of media freedom in my regressions (see section 3.4 and 3.5). 
We thus see that newspaper archives are far from providing a perfect 
source of information on illegal corporate raiding attacks in Russia. 
However, the information I was able to identify using this method is 
most probably still much richer and more detailed than all other 
information publicly available on the topic to date. I also believe that 
the dataset is sufficiently large and random and presents sufficient 
variation to make at least a certain amount of inference about various 
patterns of corporate raiding in Russia possible. Finally, I also believe 
that the information included in the roughly 1500 articles that I read 
and analysed for this study is rich enough to provide a relatively clear 
descriptive picture of the phenomenon of corporate raiding under 
Putin. The next section is thus giving a range of descriptive statistics as 
well as an account of the story of corporate raiding in Russia, before 
sections 3.4 and 3.5 move on to empirically analyse the determinants of 
raiding attacks in the country.     
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3.3 Context and Descriptive Analysis 
 
Distribution of Raider Attacks over Time, Regions and Sectors 
Although Integrum covers newspaper archives from 1991 onwards, I 
found the first clearly identifiable cases of corporate raiding for the 
year 1999. This confirms earlier accounts of raiding “arising at the turn 
of the century” (Kireev 2007, page 38), with the introduction of a new 
bankruptcy law in late 1998 “triggering” the start of raider attacks 
(Volkov 2004). While from 1999 to 2002 the number of attacks remains 
relatively low, attacks increase rapidly from 2003 onwards, to reach a 
peak in 2005 and 2006 (figure 3.2). 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Number of Identified Raiding Attacks per Year 
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To show the regional distribution of raider attacks, I constructed an 
index showing the intensity of raidings across Russia's regions 
(raidings weighted by the average number of firms in a given region). 
A graphic representation of this raiding intensity index reveals 
interesting regional patterns. Apart from a concentration in Moscow, 
St. Petersburg, Tver Oblast and Primorsky Krai in the Far East, raidings 
are centred in two groups of regions (figure 3.3). One group are the 
Ural Mountains, with the heavily industrialized regions of Perm, 
Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk showing a high prevalence of raiding 
cases. A second group are the Southern Russian regions of Samara, 
Penza, Saratov, Ulyanovsk, Voronezh and Volgograd, as well as the 
republic of Chuvashia.  
 
Figure 3.3: Raiding intensity index (1999 - 2010) Raidings weighted by 
average number of firms in a given region, normalized from 1 (low intensity) to 20 (high 
intensity). White grey: 1 - 4, light grey: 5 - 8, darker grey: 9 - 12, dark grey: 13 - 16, black: 
17 - 20. 1). 
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Disaggregating attacks over time reveals the dynamics of property 
conflicts in Putin's Russia (figure 3.4). In the early 2000s, corporate 
raiding attacks were concentrated in centres of heavy industry such as 
the Ural Mountains (Perm Krai, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblast), 
the Republic of Tatarstan or the region of Ulyanovsk, where large 
industrial conglomerates were trying to complete and consolidate their 
economic empires through hostile takeovers. Simultaneously, a number 
of ambitious latecomers such as the infamous raider Pavel Fedulov 
from Yekaterinburg were trying to belatedly build their own holding 
companies. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Raiding intensity index over time for Western Russia  
Raidings weighted by average number of firms in a given region, normalized from 1 (low 
intensity) to 20 (high intensity). White grey: 1 - 4, light grey: 5 - 8, darker grey: 9 - 12, dark 
grey: 13 - 16, black: 17 - 20.  
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After 2005, the number of raiding attacks declines in the Urals and 
other heavily industrialized regions such as Ulyanovsk Oblast and 
Tatarstan, indicating a consolidation of property. At the same time, a 
shift in raiding cases towards a new centre of gravity around the 
Southern Russian regions of Ryazan, Tambov, Voronezh, Volgograd, 
Saratov and Samara becomes visible. 
This shift in the regional distribution of attacks is also reflected in the 
sectoral distribution of raiding cases. While in the early 2000s, attacks 
are concentrated in the manufacturing sector, around 2005 a clear 
change is visible, with services, retail, transport and construction 
becoming the sectors mainly affected (figure 3.5). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Raider attacks by year and sector (as percentage of all attacks; NR: 
natural resources, A: Agriculture, M: manufacturing, S&T: science & technology, S: 
services, R: retail, TR: transport, C: construction). 
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The fact that raiders shift their attention from one sector to others over 
time shows the dynamics of property rights consolidation in an 
economy that is still in transition. In the early 2000s, the ownership 
situation of many manufacturing enterprises was still unstable. Many 
former Soviet company directors had acquired controlling stakes of 
their companies during the privatizations of the 1990s, and had thus 
become de-facto owners (the so called “red directors”, see Barnes 2006). 
These directors were often unable to oppose well-organized raiding 
attacks, especially if raiders were acting on behalf and with the 
resources of larger conglomerates, or with the support of state agencies.  
However, once a large number of factories had become part of bigger 
holding companies, these large holdings were better able to protect 
their assets, with the manufacturing sector consequently experiencing a 
certain consolidation in the second half of the 2000s. As it became more 
difficult for raiders to attack firms in the manufacturing sector, they 
shifted their focus to sectors that were easier targets, such as services, 
retail and construction. 
 
Firm Characteristics 
Taking a closer look at the characteristics of the firms in the present 
dataset helps to illustrate this point. In the early 2000s, the typical firms 
affected by raider attacks were large industrial enterprises with still 
high numbers of employees as a legacy from Soviet times, such as the 
steel works A.K. Serov in Yekaterinburg (attacked in 1999), the 
Kachkanarsk Mining Company (attacked in 2000), the Zapadno-
Sibirskiy Metallurgicheskiy Kombinat in Novokuznetsk (attacked in 
2000), or the Achinsk Alumina Refinery near Krasnoyarsk (attacked in 
2002).  
Eventually, as the manufacturing sector became more consolidated, 
raiders put their sights on a much larger spectrum of firms in different 
sectors and of different size. Typical examples of targeted firms in the 
second half of the 2000s range from restaurants, hotels and tourist 
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centres over car dealers, smaller supermarkets and specialized shops to 
agricultural companies, local housing service providers, transport 
companies or scientific research institutes. A number of large retail 
firms, such as the cosmetics chain Arbat Prestige, the mobile phone 
retailer Evroset, the supermarket chain Lenta or the electronic retailers 
Svyaznoy and Eldorado were also attacked during the late 2000s.   
Table 3.6 illustrates this phenomenon. We see that from an average 
number of 3000 employees per attacked firm in the first half of the 
2000s, the number falls to an average of around 750 employees from 
2005 onwards. The high numbers for turnover and total assets between 
2008 and 2010 are due to the attacks on big retail firms during this time. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Average yearly turnover, total assets and number of 
employees of attacked firms 
Left y-axis: th USD, right y-axis: employees; data from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), available 
for 216 of the 312 firms in the dataset. Data for the large oil companies Yukos (attacked in 
2003) and Russneft (attacked in 2007) has been excluded from the graph, as turnover (8.4 
billion for Yukos, 4.6 billion for Russneft for the respective year of attack) and total assets 
figures (18.7 billion for Yukos, 6 billion for Russneft, respective year of attack) were much 
higher than for all other firms in the sample. 
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One common characteristic of the firms attacked during the second half 
of the decade is that most had been established during the late 1990s or 
the early 2000s. One can thus also identify a shift from old Soviet 
industrial property being targeted towards attacks against new and 
often innovative companies that have been founded during Russia’s 
economic boom in the early 2000s.  
This can be seen as a sign that the nature of raiding attacks in Russia 
has actually become more harmful over time. While some of the early 
raiding cases eventually led to industrial restructuring and the 
consolidation of holding companies (thus in the outcome resembling 
takeover cases in the West), the increasing number of attacks on young 
innovative firms since 2005 might constitute a growing threat to 
Russia's investment and incentive climate, as more and more the 
country's most dynamic companies are targeted. Although it is of 
course difficult to establish direct causality, the resulting negative 
incentive climate might be one of the reasons why entry of new firms 
has been consistently declining in Russia over the last 15 years (EBRD 
2012, see also figure 1.3 in the introduction).  
 
Raider Groups and the Involvement of State Agencies29 
Who are the people that carry out a corporate raid? Volkov (2000, 2002) 
has described how the criminal groups that emerged during the late 
1980s throughout Russia became increasingly well organized and 
established in the 1990s, up to the point that most businesses in Russia 
had to make regular payments to a protection racket or private security 
agency. Volkov called these criminal groups and private security 
agencies “violent entrepreneurs”, as they used their ability to apply 
organized force to fill the vacuum left by the crumbling Soviet state. 
During these years, state agencies had lost the monopoly of violence, 
                                                          
29 The analysis in this part is based both on secondary sources, and on a summary of the 
information I assembled through the study of the 1500 newspaper articles that I collected 
and read for this study.  
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and were often just another competitor on the market for protection 
money. 
With the beginning of Russia's economic recovery after the financial 
crash in 1998, state agencies received better funding, re-consolidated 
and were eventually able to regain the monopoly of violence on the 
territory of the Russian state. Being pushed out of their initial market, 
many criminal groups legalized their structures and evolved into 
business groups or private security agencies. Others hired lawyers and 
began to work as consulting agencies for firms involved in corporate 
conflicts, using the connections and knowledge they had gained during 
the 1990s. Firms that were interested in taking over a rival approached 
these newly founded agencies, and soon the former violent 
entrepreneurs were carrying out corporate raids for a number of big 
business groups that wanted to consolidate their economic holdings 
(Bloom et al., 2003). According to Aldabergenova (2010), in 2004 no less 
than 100 such agencies were offering their services in Moscow alone, 
while Privalov and Volkov (2007) speak of “several dozen professional 
agencies throughout Russia”. 
A characteristic feature of these raiding groups are the close links they 
entertain with state agencies. During the early 1990s, the former Soviet 
security apparatus experienced a significant reduction of personnel. 
Many members of the security services that had lost their job went into 
the private sector, often joining private security agencies or other 
groups controlled by violent entrepreneurs. However, they kept close 
contact with colleagues that were still working for the state (Volkov 
2000).  
After the turn of the century, these former secret service members or 
policemen started using their connections to facilitate the corporate 
raids the agencies they worked for were conducting. As a result, raids 
were increasingly carried out with the active support of law 
enforcement agencies, tax officials, or the judiciary. Eventually, 
members of state agencies also started to directly play the role of a 
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raiding group in carrying out attacks for payment30, in conducting 
raider attacks in the interest of higher placed regional and state 
officials, or in attacking companies for their own benefit (see e.g. 
Ledeneva 2013, pages 192-194). 
In June 2010, then President Dmitry Medvedev denounced this state of 
affairs in an official meeting about corporate raiding with interior 
minister Rashid Nurgaliyev, deploring that “as a rule, these crimes are 
committed with the support of law enforcement officials”31. In the 
literature on corporate raiding, there is a strong consensus that it is 
almost impossible to carry out a successful raid without the help of 
state agencies.  
Bloom et al. (2003) underline that “the main tool employed in the recent 
wave of hostile takeovers in Russia is the judicial branch of 
government, plus 'administrative resources'”, while Volkov (2004) 
maintains that “the central feature of enterprise takeovers [is] the use of 
state courts, of special police forces, and of regional administrations to 
execute the change of management and ownership by means of 
physical or administrative coercion.” Similarly, Privalov and Volkov 
(2007) argue that raiders usually operate with the help of elements in 
the judiciary, the security services or tax agencies, and that most 
raiding agencies are protected by some regional-level official in the FSB 
(Russia's federal security service).  
For my sample, I checked for each raiding case if the illegal 
involvement of state agencies was mentioned. As it is likely that 
various state agencies (e.g. the police or the judiciary) are also 
associated with a raiding attack as part of their normal activities (e.g. in 
trying to help an attacked company, without being in any way acting 
                                                          
30 A range of price lists are available on the internet, showing how much it would 
approximately cost to enlist a state agency for the provision of various raiding and 
enforcement services (see e.g. Aldabergenova 2010). 
31 Meeting between President Dmitry Medvedev and Minister of the Interior Rashid 
Nurgaliyev, Vnukovo Airport, 1.06.2010; “Law on improving the effectiveness of anti-
raiding measures has been signed” (eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/532). 
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illegally), I took special care to check if the involvement of a state 
agency could indeed be characterized as illegal. Illegal state 
involvement is noted if at least two independent sources state that state 
agencies have acted against the law to support a raider attack, or have 
attacked a given company by themselves and acted in a predatory way 
(e.g. by supplying organized force, by arresting entrepreneurs on minor 
charges in order to facilitated an attack and make it more difficult for 
entrepreneurs to defend themselves, by refusing to investigate an 
attack when called upon, or by providing forged documents that then 
have been used in an attack). Various examples of illegal state 
involvement are provided below.  
For 52.8% of cases, newspaper sources clearly stated that state agencies 
were supporting the group that carried out the raid, or were 
themselves initiators of an attack. Looking on state involvement over 
time, one can find a structural break occurring around the year 2003. 
While from 1999 to 2002, illegal state involvement was mentioned for 
37% of cases, from 2003 to 2010, state agencies were involved in 61% of 
cases (figure 3.7).  
Figure 3.7: Involvement of corrupt state agencies in illegal raider 
attacks (% of all attacks) 
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This increasing involvement of state structures in raiding cases and 
criminal persecution of businesses is also found by other studies. For 
example, Gans-Morse (2012) finds in a study based on 90 interviews 
and a survey carried out in 2009 and 2010 that threats to firms' property 
rights from the side of predatory state agencies have increased sharply 
after 2003, with firms also increasingly paying corrupt state officials to 
help solving corporate conflicts. In another recent paper, Yakovlev, 
Baranov and Nazrullaeva (2013) find an upward trend in predatory 
criminal persecution practices of entrepreneurs between 2004 and 2009. 
They however accord this fact mainly to the inefficient organization of 
the Russian police32, although rent seeking behaviour and private 
interests of law enforcement officials also play a role.  
To have a look at the nature of state involvement, I checked for each 
case what kind of state agency was involved. While the judiciary was 
involved in 21% of cases, the security services in 19% and tax agencies 
in 17%, the involvement of local and regional administrations was 
mentioned for 15% of cases, and some kind of regulatory agency was 
involved in 8% of cases. 
In a typical case, the police or officials from a regulatory agency would 
confiscate corporate documentation during a regulatory control. These 
documents would then be used by corporate raiders in a takeover 
attack. An example is the attack on the meat processing factory Plutos 
in Moscow in 2004, where the owner was investigated by local police 
on charges that were soon dropped. However, the police asked him to 
provide a range of corporate documentation, which he submitted. Six 
months later, these documents were used in a successful takeover 
attack on Plutos. The company was resold six times in three months, 
with the premises and equipment finally being sold off and the 
company being dissolved, before the case could be heard in court.33 
                                                          
32 With performance indicators that force policemen to file an increasing number of 
claims over time, the so called “stick system”.  
33 Vedomosti, 21.09.2009;  www.utro.ru, 01.12.2011 
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In other cases, the security services facilitated or provided logistical 
support for takeover attacks, or refused to intervene when called upon. 
In the well documented attack on the cosmetics chain Arbat Prestige, 
competitors allegedly paid police organs for help in attacking the 
company34. During an attack on Alstom-SEMS in 2001 (a company 
producing electrical machinery in Yekaterinburg), the police arrested 
the security service of the company in the middle of the night and 
drove them off in two minibuses to a forest 40 km outside of town. Two 
hours later, the company was taken over by 70 armed men35. When the 
chemical company Uralchimmash was attacked in Yekaterinburg in 
September 2000, the police helped the raider Pavel Fedulev to enforce 
his ownership claims, which were based on fraudulent 
documentation36. During the attack on a meat processing factory in 
Yekaterinburg in 2006 (Yekaterinburgsky Mjasokombinat), the police 
arrived but left again, calling the attack a "dispute amongst 
management entities"37. In Perm Oblast, the police, although called 
upon, allegedly cooperated with raiders by purposefully not 
investigating several cases of corporate theft38.  
The police also increasingly arrested entrepreneurs on minor charges, 
thus weakening their ability to defend themselves against attacks. 
While entrepreneurs were in prison, their companies were attacked by 
raiders, as happened for example in the case of the agricultural firm 
Agromol in 200839. Volkov et al. (2010) show that in a large part of 
criminal cases related to economic crimes, these cases are not resulting 
from any wrongdoing by the arrested entrepreneurs, but are rather an 
outcome of services offered by law enforcement agents to raider groups 
and economic competitors.  
                                                          
34 Kommersant, 25.01.2008; The Moscow Times, 11.10.2010 
35 NEWSru.com, 06.06.2001 
36 eanews.ru, 19.06.2006; urbc.ru, 13.06.2010 
37 Kommersant Ekaterinburg, 30.11.2006; uralpolit.ru, 08.12.2006 
38 Kommersant, 22.05.2009; http://ilya-shulkin.livejournal.com/779.html  
39 Kommersant, 21.11.2012; gazeta.ru, 26.05.2011 
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In a growing number of cases, security services themselves seemed to 
be among the initiators of attacks. Probably the most prominent 
example is the attack on the investment fund Hermitage Capital 
Management. Hermitage claims that the attack was initiated by a 
lieutenant-colonel in the Department of Tax Crime of the Interior 
Ministry, and approved of by the FSB. Allegedly, phoney tax claims 
were used to take over several companies, the accounts of which were 
then forged to claim large tax-repayments from the Russian state40. 
Privalov and Volkov (2007) argue that over time, a change in quality in 
the relation between security services and raider groups did happen. 
While at the beginning of the 2000s, raider groups paid corrupt state 
officials in return for logistical support, after a certain time members of 
the security services started to use raider groups as instruments to 
achieve their own objectives. Due to their initial cooperation with 
raiding agencies, the security services were well informed about illegal 
raids carried out by raider groups. They then used this information to 
blackmail and force raiders to carry out additional raids, with 
themselves becoming the main beneficiaries. In my sample of 1500 
newspaper articles, I find evidence that confirms this hypothesis. While 
big industrial holdings are frequently mentioned as hiring raiding 
agencies to initiate attacks during the early years of the decade, from 
the mid-2000s onwards articles increasingly note that members of state 
agencies themselves ordered, initiated and benefited from attacks.  
While the security services play a prominent role in raider attacks, 
especially because of their capability to use force, prosecutors, judges 
and the judicial system are equally involved. Often, raiders approach 
courts asking for legal decisions to obtain search warrants or official 
confirmation of ownership changes. These warrants are then used to 
occupy companies with the help of private security companies or local 
police forces. Although claims made by raiders are often based on 
fraudulent documentation, courts frequently grant the raiders' 
requests, either because they have been bribed, or because they did not 
understand the requests' fraudulent nature.  
                                                          
40 New York Times, 24.07.2008; Vedomosti, 04.04.2008 
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For example, in the takeover battle over the Angarsk cement plant in 
2007, raiders used search warrants to justify their forced occupation of 
the plant. The search warrants were issued by small local courts located 
far away from the city of Angarsk. Although the courts reversed their 
decisions in several cases after having realized that they had been 
victims of fraud, the search warrants had already served their 
purpose41.  
While the security services and the judiciary seem to be the state 
institutions most actively involved in raider attacks, the tax service also 
plays a significant role. An example is the attempt by the company 
Syntech to take over the world’s largest ammonia producer Togliatti 
Azot in 2005. Shortly after Syntech acquired 10% of Togliatti Azot stock 
and tried to take control over the company’s board of directors, Togliatti 
Azot was subject to sever pressure and a series of regulatory controls 
(120 in 18 months) by the tax authorities, in what allegedly amounted 
to a coordinated attack on Togilatti Azot42. The case of the Moscow book 
retailer Biblio Globus in 2007, where raiders obtained the company’s 
constituent documents through the tax office and then used them in 
their attack43, or the sudden and substantial tax claims that pushed the 
telecommunications company Svyaznoy on the brink of bankruptcy in 
2008 are further examples44. 
By far the most famous involvement of tax agencies is the attack against 
the oil company Yukos that began in 2003. After the arrest of its owner 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky in late 2003, the company was presented with a 
series of tax claims that amounted to $27 billion, forcing the company 
to sell its core asset Yuganskneftegaz and eventually to declare 
bankruptcy in 2006. Shortly after Yuganskneftegaz was acquired by the 
then unknown shell company Baikal-Finansgrup in December 2004, 
Baikal-Finansgrup was bought by the state owned oil company Rosneft, 
thus confirming the political nature of the raid.  
                                                          
41 Novaya Gazeta, 28.05.2007; compromat.ru, 04.09.2006 
42 Rossiskaya Gazeta, 07.06.2011; zhavat.ru, 06.09.2010  
43 Kommersant, 28.02.2008; litrossia.ru, 07.03.2008 
44 Vedomosti, 11.02.2008; Kommersant 11.02.2008  
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Due to its political implications, Yukos is not a typical raiding case but 
rather a personal reckoning between a leading businessman with 
political ambitions and president Putin, who in arresting 
Khodorkovsky eliminated a potentially dangerous political challenger 
(see e.g. Sakwa 2008). In the Yukos case, Russian courts have also 
repeatedly ruled that both the attack and Khodorkovsky’s 
imprisonment are legal, thus making it difficult to strictly define the 
case as one of illegal state involvement. 
However, although different in scope and nature than the other raider 
attacks in our sample, the Yukos affair still has important implications 
with regard to the involvement of state officials in corporate raiding. As 
shown above, the attack on Yukos in late 2003 coincides with a notable 
and lasting increase in the involvement of state agencies in raiding 
attacks (figure 3.7), as well as with a significant increase in the overall 
number of cases (figure 3.2). The number of entrepreneurs arrested on 
phoney charges also grew markedly after 2003, with Gans-Morse (2012, 
page 38) arguing that “after 2003, the initial year of the Khodorkovsky 
Affair, there was a notable increase in the number of economic crimes 
uncovered by Ministry of Internal Affairs investigators”. 
 
What are the determinants of increasing state predation? 
 
Why do we find an increasing involvement of state agencies in raiding 
cases over time, especially for the period after the Yukos attack? Many 
observers see a link between Yukos and the increasingly predatory 
nature of Russian state agencies, with “every official after 2003 looking 
for his own little Yukos” (interview with the social activist Yana 
Yakovleva, cited by Gans-Morse 2012, page 36; see also Yakovlev 2012). 
In other words, it seems to be possible that once state officials at the 
very top started to steal openly, mid- and low-level state officials saw 
no reason to keep back either.  
Two main hypotheses have been advanced to explain this increasingly 
predatory behaviour of Russian state agencies. According to the first 
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view, the central state has increasingly lost the ability to fully control 
local and regional state agencies. For example, Gans-Morse (2012) 
argues that these agencies have successfully opposed attempts by the 
centre to initiate reforms, which would have put into danger their 
ability to capture rents. 
As a result, local law enforcement agencies are now widely active in the 
shadow economy, often cooperating with and playing the role of 
enforcement agents for criminal and raider groups (Kosals and Dubova 
2012). The growing number of statements by Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev acknowledging the increase and emphasising the 
necessity to fight bureaucratic corruption could be seen as an argument 
in support of this hypothesis. 
In addition, deficiencies within the institutional structure of Russia’s 
security agencies also led to an increase in predatory criminal 
persecution practices, as members of the security forces face incentives 
that force them to ever increase the number of criminal charges filed 
(Yakovlev, Baranov and Nazrullaeva 2013).  
While the first line of argumentation thus proposes an explanation 
linked to the way Russia’s institutions are organized and reforms are 
implemented, the second one suggests a more direct link between the 
increase in economic crimes committed by Russian state officials, and 
the political system put into place and consolidated under Vladimir 
Putin. 
Mendras (2012) argues that the very institutional changes introduced 
by Putin to consolidate his hold on power are at the origin of an 
increasing institutional decay in Russia. Especially from 2004 onwards, 
Putin has dismantled many of the institutions that have formerly 
assured at least a degree of accountability and democratic control, such 
as independent television channels or the election of provincial 
governors (centrally appointed from 2005 onwards). Due to the federal 
centre's selective interference in various law cases, the judiciary as an 
independent institution has also largely ceased to function (Mendras 
2012, pages 175-181). The increase in predatory activities by state 
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agencies might thus be related to a concomitant decline of institutional 
quality, with the apparent strengthening of the federal centre and 
Putin’s “vertical of power” making it actually more difficult for the 
centre to prevent local and regional state from acting in a predatory 
way, as various institutional control mechanism have been disabled.  
An analysis complementing the one by Mendras is offered by Taylor 
(2011). He first shows how Putin has substantially strengthened the 
role of coercive agencies in the Russian state, and then argues that this 
has been accompanied by only a limited and one-sided increase in state 
capacity. While at the end of the 2000s the Russian state was 
significantly more able to repress oppositional movements than when 
Putin came to power, the ability of the security services to perform core 
law enforcement tasks such as fighting crime and terrorism has not 
improved, with the situation rather getting worse in some areas such as 
the security of property rights. 
Taylor attributes this to the pathologies inherent in the way the power 
ministries work, such as the dominance of informal and personalistic 
decision-making, the lack of a monitoring and control structure, and 
the widespread persistence of Soviet-type belief structures 
characterized by conspiracy theories, a dislike of democratic political 
competition (often associated with 'disorder'), and the fear of Russia 
being threatened by external and internal enemies. While this specific 
mode of operation permitted the centre to use the security services to 
effectively suppress political opposition, the lack of transparency and 
accountability characteristic of this same mode of operation make it 
difficult for the security services to effectively fight abuse of power and 
illegal activities in their own ranks. 
Consequently, even if the central state was willing to decisively tackle 
bureaucratic corruption and predatory behaviour by state agencies, this 
will only be possible after a broad reform of the security services and 
Russia's institutional system more generally. However, such a reform 
would in turn put into jeopardy the ability of the ruling elites to 
successfully control and suppress political opposition. As the capacity 
to do this is one of the pillars the current political system is built upon, 
  
94 
 
Putin and the ruling elites effectively face a trade-off between their 
secure hold on power, and an improvement of the rule of law that 
would permit them to tackle the problem of predatory state agencies. 
The argument I advance in chapter 2 goes into a similar direction. I 
argue that the federal centre actually faces a trade-off between fostering 
economic growth and a favourable business climate in the regions, and 
assuring that regional elites deliver high vote shares for the Kremlin 
party and presidential candidate in Duma and presidential elections. 
Developing this hypothesis further, it might be conceivable that the 
elites in the centre are prepared to turn a blind eye on a certain level of 
predatory activities by regional elites, as long as these regional elites 
are able to deliver sufficiently high political and electoral support for 
the federal centre. In the next section, I will now try to test this 
hypothesis empirically.  
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3.4 Empirical model 
 
This section is proposing an empirical test for a potential link between 
the increasing predatory behaviour of state agencies, and the 
mechanism assuring political control of the ruling elites in an electoral 
authoritarian regime, using data from the Russian Federation between 
1999 and 2010.  
Following the reasoning in the last section of part 3 above, the first 
hypothesis we are going to test is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher are the vote shares for the 
Kremlin candidate and party in presidential and Duma 
elections, as well as the degree of electoral 
manipulation in a given region, the higher will be the 
amount of predatory activities (measured by the 
number of raiding attacks per year) in a given region.  
I will then also test to what extend the data in this study supports the 
argument made by Olson (1993) and Libman, Kozlov and Schultz 
(2012). Both studies argue that the weaker is the attachment of regional 
officials to a given region, the stronger is the likelihood that they will 
act in a predatory way (i.e. the likelihood that they can be characterized 
as roving rather than as stationary bandits). Accordingly, our second 
hypothesis to test will be the following: 
Hypothesis 2: The longer a regional governor has been 
serving in a given region, the better is his personal 
record in fostering regional economic growth, and the 
weaker are his ties to the federal centre, the lower will 
be the number of harmful predatory activities by local 
state officials (measured by the number of raiding 
attacks per year) in a given region. 
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To test both hypotheses, I will use a fixed-effects panel model, using 
data for 81 Russian regions for the time period 1999 to 2010. The 
following econometric specification will be used: 
 
                                                             
                                         
                                                                      
 
where     are the number of raiding attacks in a given region during a 
given year, election are the vote shares for either the Kremlin party 
United Russia in Duma elections or for the Kremlin candidate in 
presidential elections, irregular is the degree to which elections have 
been manipulated in a given region, tenure is the number of years a 
regional governor has been in office, central is a dummy equal to 1 if a 
governor had no previous links to a region prior to becoming governor, 
growth is regional GDP growth or regional GDP growth weighted by 
the time a governor was in office (see below for how this second 
indicator is constructed), media is an indicator for the degree of media 
freedom in a region, and firms stands for the number of firms in a 
region weighted by the population. 
In addition, I also add a vector X of further regional control variables, 
such as proxies for the degree of organized crime, criminal activity and 
the level of human capital in a region, the age of a regional governor, 
an indicator of political instability, logged regional GDP per capita, the 
percentage of the population that is ethnically Russian, and a dummy 
being equal to one for the 10 biggest oil producing regions in Russia. 
Finally, year and region are time and regional dummies, and 
    represents an idiosyncratic error term that is assumed to be 
uncorrelated with other explanatory variables. 
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Data on presidential and Duma election results in Russia's regions have 
been obtained from the Russian Central Election Commission 
(www.cikrf.ru). The variable describing election irregularities 
(irregular) comes from an article by Dmitry Oreshkin, published in 
Novaya Gazeta in November 2007 (Oreshkin 2007). For the time period 
1995 to 2007, Oreshkin identifies and collects various statistics that 
might indicate possible election irregularities from the website of the 
Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, such as an 
implausibly high or low participation rate in elections (1), an 
implausibly high number of invalid votes (2), a very high or low share 
of votes “against all”45 (3), an implausibly high vote share for a single 
party or candidate (approaching 100% in some Russian regions) (4), 
and a high difference between results in a particular voting district and 
results in neighbouring districts (5). He then aggregates these various 
measures to build an index that is ranking Russia's regions according to 
the degree that election irregularities occurred.  
Data on regional governors (tenure, central and age) have been gathered 
from official sources, such as the official websites of regional governors 
which normally provide extensive biographical information, as well as 
from other websites such as Wikipedia and various Russian websites 
that provide biographical data. For the variable central, I define that a 
previous link to a province exists if a governor was born, had lived or 
worked for a period longer than 6 months in a given region, prior to 
being elected or appointed governor of the region. 
Data on regional economic growth, on regional crime levels (measured 
by the number of criminal cases filed by year and capita in a given 
region, as well as by the number of murders committed by year and 
capita), as well as on the quality of human capital (proxied by the 
number of university students per capita in a region) are from the 
Russian Federal Statistics Service Rosstat.  
                                                          
45 Until 2006, Russian electoral ballots contained a box named “against all”, allowing the 
voter to register a protest vote against all the candidates running.   
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Regional political instability is measured by a ranking published every 
year by the Russian rating agency Expert RA, with regions with higher 
political instability being given a higher ranking. Media freedom is a 
yearly indicator constructed by Nikolay Petrov at the Carnegie Centre 
in Moscow. Finally, the percentage of the population that is ethnically 
Russian (an indicator for the ethnic homogeneity of a given region) has 
been obtained from the website of Russia's national population census 
in 2010 (www.perepis-2010.ru). 
To measure the personal economic performance of a regional governor, 
I use an indicator representing regional GDP growth weighted by the 
time a governor is in office. To construct the indicator, I follow Li and 
Zhou (2005, page 1755), who build a similar indicator to measure the 
economic performance of Chinese regional officials. The indicator is a 
moving average measure of the GDP growth rate over the time a 
governor is in office,  ̃ , which is defined as  
 ̃   
 
 
 ∑  
 
   
 
where T is the number of years a governor is in office up to the point of 
calculation, t is the t-th year (t = 1, 2,..., T-1, T), and    is the GDP 
growth in the year t for a region. Thus,  ̃  corresponds to an evaluation 
mechanism in which there is an annual assessment of a regional 
governor’s economic performance, with the assessment for each year 
being based both on the past and on the current regional growth rate 
during the time a governor is office. 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for all variables used in this 
study. 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Presidential 
elections 
972 0.637 0.124 0.250 0.998 
Duma 
elections 
972 0.400 0.181 0.014 0.987 
Election 
irregularities 
972 0.206 0.228 0 1 
Log GRP per 
capita 
972 11.222 0.959 8.537 14.152 
Tenure 972 6.662 4.342 1 19 
Central 972 0.081 0.273 0 1 
GRP growth 972 0.054 0.065 -0.228 0.787 
GRP growth 
(weighted) 
972 0.042 0.043 -0.202 0.357 
Media  972 2.753 0.859 1 5 
Firms (per 
1000 people) 
972 24.448 13.293 7.882 115.11 
Crime  972 0.021 0.007 0.0031 0.049 
Murder 972 0.204 0.107 0.054 0.906 
Human cap. 972 0.038 0.017 0 0.126 
Political 
instability 
972 45.676 25.234 1 88 
Ethnic 972 0.776 0.246 0.0078 0.973 
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3.5 Regression Results 
 
Table 3.2 presents the results of the regression analysis. We see that the 
vote share for the Kremlin candidate in presidential elections, as well as 
the vote share for the Kremlin party United Russia in Duma elections 
are indeed significantly and positively correlated with the number of 
raider attacks in a given region. The coefficient for the degree to which 
elections are manipulated throughout Russia’s regions is also 
significant and positive. The regression results thus corroborate 
hypothesis 1 (page 74). 
From Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi (2012), we know that regional 
governors are under pressure to deliver electoral support for the centre 
during Duma and presidential elections. Frye et al. also show that 
governors extensively use their respective administrations (or “political 
machines”) to manipulate elections and deliver expected results. 
Moreover, in chapter 2 we have seen that delivering election results is 
one of the main criteria influencing the probability of regional 
governors being reappointed (at least for the time period after 2006), 
while the economic performance of a given region plays no or even a 
negative role in this respect.  
In other words, the central elites in Russia seem to accord a high 
importance to a good electoral performance of the Kremlin candidate 
and party in national elections, while regional economic development 
seems to be relatively less important. While we do not have any 
evidence that the Kremlin is directly trading access to economic assets 
against the delivery of electoral support, it is quite conceivable that at 
least a certain degree of predatory activities in a given region are 
tolerated by the centre, as long as regional administrations are able to 
deliver sufficiently high levels of political support.  
This would also explain why the central state has been consistently 
hesitant to intervene or condemn predatory activities by regional state  
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 Table 3.2: Regression Results 
 OLS; dependent variable: raiding attacks per year and region; 
robust standard errors; *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance 
level, * 10% significance level; significant results marked bold. 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 
Pres. elections 1.398** 
(0.696) 
 1.299* 
(0.682) 
 
Duma elections  0.881* 
(0.532) 
 0.879* 
(0.531) 
Election 
irregularities 
1.327* 
(0.797) 
1.914*** 
(0.688) 
1.401* 
(0.799) 
1.718*** 
(0.664) 
Tenure -0.024* 
(0.013) 
-0.22* 
(0.013) 
-0.025** 
(0.013) 
-0.024* 
(0.013) 
Central 0.045 
(0.106) 
0.043 
(0.108) 
0.045 
(0.107) 
0.045 
(0.109) 
Weighted GDP 
growth 
-1.933** 
(0.796) 
-1.78** 
(0.755) 
  
Annual GDP 
growth 
  -0.147 
(0.452) 
-0.106 
(0.447) 
Media freedom 0.205** 
(0.098) 
0.212** 
(0.099) 
0.196** 
(0.097) 
0.203** 
(0.098) 
Firms (per 1000 
people) 
0.045** 
(0.023) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
0.044* 
(0.023) 
Crime  0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
Murder 0.647 
(0.618) 
0.347 
(0.688) 
0.535 
(0.688) 
0.246 
(0.697) 
Governor’s age  0.007 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.005) 
Human capital 19.352 
(14.832) 
18.444 
(14.915) 
18.722 
(14.994) 
17.958 
(15.066) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
0.643* 
(0.374) 
0.629* 
(0.358) 
0.504 
(0.356) 
0.493 
(0.339) 
Political instability 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
Ethnic 0.323 
(0.656) 
0.891 
(0.544) 
0.522 
(0.658) 
0.678 
(0.518) 
Oil -0.537 
(0.509) 
-0.209 
(0.312) 
-0.35 
(0.486) 
-0.178 
(0.308) 
Time / Reg. FE yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.4502 0.4503 0.4488 0.4491 
Observations 972 972 972 972 
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officials. For example, in the cases of Hermitage Capital or Yevgeny 
Chichvarkin and the mobile retailer Evroset, the central state 
eventually turned against the victims of raider attacks to the extent that 
they had to leave the country, as they had collected too much 
incriminating evidence against regional state agencies46. 
Furthermore, we have also seen in section 3.3 that regional 
administrations, security, tax and regulatory services as well as the 
regional judiciary have increasingly been involved in predatory raiding 
attacks over the last decade. While again I have no direct evidence to 
show that those members of regional administrations that manipulate 
elections and those that are involved in predatory activities are the 
same or that they are somehow linked, this is a possibility. Presumably, 
regional administrations that regularly act illegally in manipulating 
elections might also have fewer inhibitions to participate in rent-
seeking and other predatory activities.   
However, the interpretation presented above is of course not the only 
possible one. Table 3.2 also shows that the coefficients for the number 
of criminal cases per capita in a given region is positive and significant, 
while the number of murders per capita has also a positive sign, 
although it is not significant. An alternative explanation of our 
regression results might thus be that in regions that are more heavily 
affected by criminal activities and organized crime (resulting in a 
higher number of raider cases), people vote for Vladimir Putin and his 
party, in the hope for protection.  
However, although such an alternative explanation might seem 
reasonable at first glance, it is difficult to find evidence in the literature 
in support of such an interpretation. At least since early 2011, the 
Kremlin party United Russia has been widely called “the party of 
                                                          
46 Both Hermitage Capital owner Bill Browder and Evroset founder Yevgeny 
Chichvarkin invested significant amounts of resources to investigate the attacks mounted 
against them, eventually revealing the names and affiliations of the regional officials that 
had attacked their firms. As a result, one of the lawyers hired by Hermitage Capital in the 
investigation was arrested and died in prison, while both Hermitage Capital and 
Chichvarkin had to leave Russia. 
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crooks and thieves”47 throughout Russia, making it seem unlikely that 
people would want to appeal to such a party for protection against 
predatory state agencies.  
If we now look on the coefficient for the variable measuring the length 
a regional governor has stayed in office (tenure), we see that it is 
significant and negative across all specifications. In other words, the 
longer a given governor has been serving in a region, the lower is the 
number of predatory raiding attacks that took place in his region.  
We also see that the dummy variable indicating that a governor has 
had no prior ties to a region before becoming governor is consistently 
positive, even though it is not significant. Finally, if we look on the 
personal economic performance of a governor in a given region 
(weighted GDP growth), we see that it is significantly and negatively 
correlated with the number of raiding cases. In other words, it seems 
that the better a regional governor is able to manage his region 
economically, the lower is the number of predatory activities by 
regional state officials.  
In this study, I thus find additional evidence confirming the results 
obtained by Libman, Kozlov and Schultz (2012), as well as evidence 
illustrating the argument made by Olson (1993) about roving and 
stationary bandits. The longer a governor has been serving in a given 
region, the stronger are his ties to the region, and the more he cares 
about the economic development of a region, the lower is the number 
of predatory activities by regional officials. In other words, the closer a 
governor fits the characterization of a stationary bandit developed by 
Olson (1993), the stronger indeed seem to be his interests to engage in 
the long-term development of a region (or at least in long-term rent-
seeking relationships with regional businesses), instead of focusing on 
short-term asset grabbing. 
                                                          
47 Coined by the blogger Alexey Navalny in early 2011, the nickname “party of crooks 
and thieves” for United Russia has since then been widely used throughout the country; 
see e.g. Time, 29.12.2011, “Russia Rising: The Blogger who is Putin’s Greatest Challenger”. 
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Judging from these results, it would thus be in the interest of the 
federal centre to promote regional economic stability by keeping 
governors in place for longer time periods, if the primary objective of 
the centre would be regional economic development. But from the 
results presented in chapter 2, we see this is not the case. From the time 
the Kremlin has been appointing its own candidates (i.e. from 2007 
onwards), we see that longer serving governors were systematically 
replaced by new governors that often had no prior ties to a given 
region (with length of tenure having a significant and negative effect on 
the probability of a regional governor to remain in office from 2007 
onwards, see regression results on page 44).    
Finally, we will have a short look on the regression results for media 
freedom and various economic controls. We see that the degree of 
media freedom is significantly and positively correlated with the 
number of raiding cases in a region. As the source through which 
information has been obtained in this study are newspaper articles, this 
result makes sense. The freer is the press in a given region, the higher is 
the likelihood that it will report cases of predatory corporate raiding.  
Firm density in a given region (i.e. the number of firms weighted by the 
population) as well as gross regional product per head are also 
significantly and positively correlated with the number of raiding 
attacks. It thus seems that in regions where there is more to steal, 
criminal raiding groups and corrupt state agencies are also more 
actively involved in illegal asset grabbing.  
 
 
 
 
  
105 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I present a new dataset on illegal corporate raiding 
activities that took place in Russia between 1999 and 2010. Carrying out 
a comprehensive scan of Russian national and regional newspaper 
archives and using a strict definition of illegal corporate raiding, I 
found evidence for 312 raiding cases that took place between 1999 and 
2010. 
I am able to identify a shift both in the regional and sectoral 
distribution of raiding cases over time. I also find that regional state 
agencies have become increasingly involved as supporters or initiators 
of illegal asset grabbing and illegal raider attacks, especially after the 
year 2003. This finding is in line with results that have been found 
elsewhere in the literature. I conjecture that the increase in illegal 
predatory activities by state agencies after 2003 might be linked to the 
attack on the oil company Yukos that took place in the same year, with 
regional state agencies after 2003 feeling less constrained to act in a 
predatory way, after having observed how the federal centre 
expropriated one of Russia’s leading businessmen.  
I then carry out a panel regression analysis, to look at the deeper 
determinants of corporate raiding in Russia’s regions. I find that vote 
shares for the Kremlin candidate in presidential elections, as well as 
vote shares for the Kremlin party United Russia in Duma elections and 
the degree to which elections have been manipulated in Russia’s 
regions are all positively and significantly correlated with the number 
of raiding attacks in a given region. I hypothesise that this might be 
evidence for a sort of quid-pro-quo mechanism, with the central state 
tolerating a certain degree of predatory activities by regional elites, as 
long as these same elites are able to deliver a sufficiently high level of 
electoral support for the ruling elites in the centre. 
I then also find evidence that the stronger are the ties of a governor to a 
given region, the lower is the number of raider attacks in the region. I 
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argue that these findings confirm empirical evidence found by Libman, 
Kozlov and Schultz (2012), who show that Russian governors with 
weak ties to a given region are more likely to act in a predatory way. 
My results also illustrate the argument made by Olson (1993) on 
stationary and roving bandits, by showing that regions with Russian 
governors who could be characterized as stationary bandits are less 
affected by raiding attacks than regions with governors whose lesser 
attachment to a region makes them look like roving bandits.   
This chapter thus confirms and extends the findings presented in 
chapter 2. Both studies find evidence that in the Russian Federation 
under Vladimir Putin, the central elites face a trade-off between 
ensuring their political control over the country, and promoting 
regional economic growth. While I argue in chapter 2 that regional 
governors are appointed for their ability to foster election results, rather 
than for their ability to successfully manage a regional economy, 
chapter 3 presents evidence that the federal centre might even permit 
regional elites to engage in a certain degree of stealing and asset 
grabbing, as long as these same elites are able to deliver sufficient 
political support to the centre.  
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3.8 Appendix 
 
Table 3.3: Importance and Frequency of Raiding Attacks in Russia 
(Estimates by Experts and Leading Politicians) We see that estimates vary 
considerably, but are generally much higher than the number of 312 cases I found by 
analysing Russian newspaper archives. I.e., either the biggest part of cases never makes it 
into the press, or estimates by experts are somehow inflated. 
 
Estimate Expert / Politician / 
Institution 
Source / cited by 
“...more than 60 000 
attacks per year.” 
Sergey Mironov (former 
head of the party “A 
Just Russia”) 
Demnin, Labutin (2011, 
page 140) 
“...in 2004, more than 
100 groups active in 
Moscow alone.” 
A. Kireev (Moscow city 
government) 
Aldabergenova (2010) 
“...about 5000 cases 
between 2000 and 2004, 
1900 cases in 2005 
alone.” 
Russian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry 
Demnin, Labutin (2011, 
page 140) 
“...by 2001, thousands of 
cases per year.” 
Volkov (2004) Volkov (2004, page 527) 
“...in Moscow, 11 cases 
in 2003, and in 2006 
already 53, i.e. a 5 times 
increase in 4 years.” 
Moscow city prosecutor 
Yurii Semin  
Volkov, Privalov (2007) 
“...from 2002 to 2005, 
about 5000 companies 
attacked.” 
Victor Pleskachevskii, 
head of the state 
committee for property 
Volkov, Privalov (2007) 
“...every year, about  
60.000 to 70.000 attacks 
in Russia.” 
Elena Ballask,  
St Petersburg Law 
Institute of the General 
Prosecutor 
Volkov, Privalov (2007) 
“...approximately 70.000 
Russian companies a 
year become targets of 
Carbonnell et al. (2009) Carbonnell et al. (2009, 
page 1) 
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raider attacks.” 
“In 2005 Russia’s 
Ministry of Internal 
Affairs had under 
preliminary 
investigation 346 
criminal cases connected 
with the unlawful 
seizure of firms - twice 
as many as in 2004.” 
Demidova (2007) Demidova (2007, page 
47)  
“300 Moscow businesses 
are raided every year.” 
Ivan Novitskii, deputy 
of Moscow city Duma 
(2007) 
Firestone (2008, page 
1207) 
“Every year, 60.000 to 
70.000 companies 
attacked in Russia.” 
Auditing Chamber of 
the Russian Federation 
Osipian (2011, page 8) 
“Every year, 70.000 to 
80.000 attempted raider 
attacks result in about 
5000 successful hostile 
takeovers.” 
Filimonova (2008) Filimonova (2008, page 
40) 
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Chapter 4  
Absorptive Capacity Compared: 
Evidence from Sectoral Data 
 
4.1. Introduction48 
 
Despite the emergence of newly industrialized economies and an 
increasing fragmentation of global production, most innovations are 
still carried out in a small number of R&D intensive countries (Eaton 
and Kortum 2001, Caselli and Wilson 2004). The large majority of 
developing and newly industrialized countries import technology from 
these countries (Mastromarco 2008).  
Gerschenkron (1962) and Abramovitz (1986) have argued that 
developing countries have a higher growth potential than advanced 
countries, as they can realize relatively larger productivity gains in 
adopting advanced technologies. In a theoretical paper, Acemoglu et al 
(2006) formalized the idea that developing countries should focus on 
adopting foreign technology before starting to innovate themselves. 
According to the case study literature, this is indeed what happened in 
newly industrialized countries such as South Korea, Taiwan or more 
recently China (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990, Breznitz and Murphree 
2011). In all these economies, the capacity to successfully absorb foreign 
technology has played a crucial role in sustaining high growth rates. 
Understanding differences in absorptive capacity is thus key to 
understand the large differences in productivity and income across 
countries (Prescott 1998). While the technological distance from R&D 
intensive countries determines the scale of potential benefits from 
                                                          
48 This chapter is a joint work with Letizia Montinari, University of Trento. 
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importing technology, and trade liberalization opens up channels of 
technology transfer, the ability of a country to absorb imported 
technology is crucial to realize the potential gains from catching-up and 
trade. 
The aim of this paper is to examine levels and determinants of 
absorptive capacity for two groups of industrialized and emerging 
economies in Asia and Latin America, and a group of European OECD 
countries that also includes the US. While this last group is composed 
of countries that have been leading industrialized nations for a long 
time, the Asian and Latin American countries in our sample, with the 
exception of Japan, are mostly developing and newly industrialized 
economies. Comparing these three country groups permits us to 
investigate if levels and determinants of absorptive capacity 
systematically differ across regions that are at different levels of 
economic development, and share different political and historical 
contexts. 
How to measure absorptive capacity? In our paper, we take technical 
efficiency of each manufacturing industry in a given country as a proxy 
for absorptive capacity. Technical efficiency is both measurable and a 
close approximation of the concept of absorptive capacity we have in 
mind. To estimate levels and determinants of technical efficiency we 
use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and sectoral data, which permits 
us to treat technical efficiency and technical change as two distinct 
components of total factor productivity (TFP) in each industry. 
Instead of using SFA, most previous studies in the absorptive capacity 
literature have employed a two-stage modelling strategy (Senhadji 
2000, Miller and Upadhyay 2000, Madsen et al. 2010), which however 
suffers from a number of flaws (that we discuss in section 2). The few 
studies using SFA have either focused on OECD countries (Griffith et 
al. 2003, 2004, Kneller and Stevens 2006), or have used aggregate data 
(Mastromarco 2008, Henry et al. 2009), and do not have data for recent 
years. Using sectoral instead of aggregate data permits us to get more 
precise results, and to distinguish between effects on low-tech and 
high-tech sectors. As sectoral data has become available only recently 
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for many developing countries, this paper is the first one, to our 
knowledge, that combines SFA with the use of sectoral data for both 
developed and developing countries. 
We investigate the effect of two potential determinants of absorptive 
capacity, namely human capital measured by years of schooling, and 
the effectiveness of domestic R&D, proxied by the stock of patents filed 
by a country. While most previous studies have either examined the 
effects of human capital (Nelson and Phelps 1966, Cohen and Levinthal 
1989, Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, 2005) or R&D expenditure (Verspagen 
1991, Fagerberg 1994, Aghion and Howitt 2005) on absorptive capacity, 
we follow more recent studies that look on both determinants (Kneller 
and Stevens 2006). However, instead of R&D expenditure we use stock 
of patents as a proxy for R&D, which to our knowledge has not been 
done before in this context. 
The contributions of this paper to the literature are thus twofold. To 
our knowledge, this paper is the first using SFA and sectoral data to 
comparatively analyse efficiency levels and determinants of absorptive 
capacity across three groups of developed and developing countries. 
Secondly, instead of R&D expenditure, we introduce the use of stock of 
patents as a proxy for R&D to the absorptive capacity literature. 
We find that levels of technical efficiency slightly increase over the time 
span covered in our study, with the exception of Latin America, where 
efficiency in high-tech sectors experiences a sharp drop after 1999. A 
temporary drop in high-tech efficiency, albeit less pronounced, is also 
noticeable for Asia and OECD countries after 1999. While in Europe 
low-tech sectors are on average more efficient than high-tech sectors, 
the opposite is the case for Asia and the US, with Latin America 
showing mixed results. Looking on the determinants of technical 
efficiency, we find that human capital has always a strongly positive 
effect on efficiency, especially in low-tech sectors. An increase in the 
stock of patents has positive effects on efficiency in high-tech sectors, 
but negative effects in low-tech sectors, especially for Asia and Latin 
America.  
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In the following, section 4.2 will discuss our empirical strategy, and 
section 4.3 presents the data. Section 4.4 shows the results for our 
frontier estimation, for the efficiency levels and for determinants of 
technical efficiency, and section 5 concludes. 
 
4.2 Empirical Strategy 
We use SFA, as it provides an ideal framework to estimate technical 
inefficiency. SFA is preferred to the more popular two-stage modelling 
approach used in most of the previous literature, since it is statistically 
more accurate and matches more closely the idea of absorptive capacity 
we want to capture. 
The two-stage approach consists in estimating TFP as residual of a 
parametrized production function, and then regressing it against a 
number of factors which are considered to be linked to changes in 
productivity (Senhadji 2000, Miller and Upadhyay 2000, Madden et al. 
2001, Okabe 2002, Wang 2007, Madsen et al. 2010). However, Koop et 
al. (1999) and Koop et al. (2000) point out that while in the first stage of 
this approach the efficiency terms are assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed, in the second stage they are a function of a 
number of variables which might directly enter the production function 
specification (or be correlated with explanatory variables), thereby 
contradicting the assumption of identically distributed inefficiency 
terms (Battese and Coelli (1995), pp. 326). SFA overcomes this problem 
by assuming that technical inefficiency effects of production are 
independently but not identically distributed, and then by 
simultaneously estimating the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency 
model. 
Another important feature of SFA is that it allows us to distinguish 
between technical progress, technical efficiency, and a stochastic 
component of TFP. This distinction is omitted in the two-stage 
approach, where TFP is used as a measure of technical inefficiency. A 
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third criticism concerns the use of the country with the highest TFP as 
the numeraire in a measure of relative productivity, to account for the 
distance to the technical frontier (Griffith et al. 2004, Kneller 2005). This 
approach is based on two unrealistic assumptions. First, it assumes that 
the country with the highest TFP is at the frontier, which might not be 
true. Secondly, it assumes that a unique technology frontier exists for 
all countries. In the SFA approach, the concept of absorptive capacity is 
instead related to that of production frontier, which represents the 
maximum output that can be produced starting from any given input 
vector (i.e. the upper boundary of the production possibilities set). 
Our empirical strategy is based on that of Battese and Coelli (1995). 
Following their formulation, the stochastic production frontier can be 
expressed as  
 
                                                     (                 )                                    
 
where Yijt is output, xijt is a vector of inputs of production, β is a vector 
of parameters to be estimated, Vijt are random errors which capture the 
stochastic nature of the frontier, and Uijt are non-negative random 
variables which denote technical inefficiency of production and are 
obtained by a truncation at zero of the normal distribution with mean 
zitδ and variance σ2 (see Battese and Coelli 1995).  
The technical inefficiency effect is specified by the following equation 
 
                                                                                                                (2) 
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where zit is a vector of explanatory variables associated with technical 
inefficiency of production, δ is a vector of unknown coefficients, and 
Wijt is a random variable defined by the truncation of a normal 
distribution with zero mean and variance σ2. The requirement that     
Uijt ≥ 0 is ensured by truncating Wijt such that Wijt ≥ -zijtδ. 
To estimate equation (2), we assume a semi-translog specification (i.e. 
translog in k and l, as proposed by Kneller and Stevens 2003), which 
provides a less restrictive functional form for a production function 
 
                                  
         
                     
                                      
                                               (3) 
 
where all lower case letters represent logarithms and v = ln(ηijt), u = 
ln(εijt).  
yijt is value added, kijt is physical capital, lijt is labour supply, pijt is 
domestic knowledge measured by local R&D, and rit represents foreign 
knowledge spillovers, which are assumed to be a function of the stock 
of R&D in the five countries that contribute most to the global stock of 
R&D. 
We make the simplifying assumption that technology is factor-neutral, 
implying that output is separable in the production function and 
technology, so that we can separate technological change pit from 
efficiency uijt in TFP. A quadratic time trend, year2, is also included to 
measure technical progress not captured by local and foreign R&D.49 
Finally, a set of country fixed effects ci and a set of sector fixed effects sj 
are included to control for country and sector specific characteristics. 
                                                          
49 A similar assumption is made by Henry et al. (2009). 
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Following Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), knowledge is assumed to 
be an input in the production function. As Kneller and Stevens (2006), 
we assume that knowledge evolves with the local stock of R&D and 
with foreign knowledge spillovers, capturing technical change. To 
measure foreign R&D spillovers to the domestic economy, we follow 
Coe and Helpman (1995) and Henry et al. (2009). They use a bilateral-
imports-share weighted sum of R&D capital stocks of trade partners. 
Using the same logic, we weight the stock of R&D of the five countries 
that contribute most to the total stock of R&D by the share of imported 
machinery and equipment from these countries. This is motivated by 
the evidence that most of the world’s R&D is produced in a small 
number of R&D intensive countries and imported through R&D 
intensive inputs (Eaton and Kortum 2001, Caselli and Wilson 2004). 
Finally, we assume that knowledge transfer is partial, depending on the 
degree of economic integration across countries. Barriers to knowledge 
transfer are captured by weighting the stock of R&D by the distance to 
the source. 
                                                        ∑  
        
   
              
where n is an index for the five top countries, Pnt is the stock of R&D in 
country n, min is the share of machinery and equipment imported by 
country i from country n, and Din is the distance between country i to 
country n. 
Technical inefficiency is defined by 
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where, as before, all lower case letters represent logarithms. zit is stock 
of patents, hit is human capital, lowtech is a dummy variable taking 
value 1 when the sector is low-tech and 0 otherwise, si are sector fixed 
effects, and wijt has been defined after equation (2). 
 
The impact of knowledge on inefficiency is captured by the stock of 
patents. To our knowledge, the use of stock of patents is new in the 
empirical literature on absorptive capacity. Kneller and Stevens (2006) 
use spending on R&D in the industry to measure the effect of 
knowledge on inefficiency. In our analysis, we prefer to use stock of 
patents as a measure of knowledge for two reasons. First, we believe 
that stock of patents is a more reliable indicator of the quality and 
effectiveness of knowledge production than expenditure on R&D50. 
Second, we find stock of patents to be more robust to multicollinearity 
problems than expenditure on R&D, given the high correlation 
between spending in R&D and years of schooling that we observed 
(=0.77) in our preliminary analysis. 
 
We use average years of schooling in country i as proxy for human 
capital. The effect of both stock of patents and years of schooling is 
allowed to vary between high-tech and low-tech sectors. A number of 
studies investigate how the effect of R&D activities on efficiency and on 
productivity varies between high-tech and low-tech sectors (see 
Kumbhakar et al. (2011) for a literature review). Following this 
literature, we disentagle the effect of R&D activities, in our paper 
proxied by patents, on efficiency to highlight differences between high-
tech and low-tech sectors. We follow the same line of reasoning for 
human capital, although only a few studies have specifically looked at 
differences between high-tech and low-tech sectors in this respect. 
 
Finally, a set of sector fixed effects are added to control for sector 
specific characteristics. If the stock of knowledge and human capital 
                                                          
50 We are aware that our results might be slightly biased due to the fact that certain 
sectors feature higher appropriability conditions of innovation than others, and that 
patenting might be relatively less costly for firms in developed countries than for firms in 
developing countries. 
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positively affect absorptive capacity in the high-tech sectors, we should 
expect 1 and 3 to have a negative sign. In the low-tech sectors, we 
should expect the sum of the coefficients for both the stock of patents 
and years of schooling to be negative (e.i. 1 + 2 < 0 and 3 + 4 < 0 ). 
 
 
4.3 Data 
 
The model is estimated for a sample of 10 European and North-
American OECD countries (United Kingdom, United States, France, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark), 7 
Asian countries (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines, 
Singapore,South Korea), 5 Latin American countries (Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay) and for twenty-two manufacturing 
industries over the period 1996-2005.51 We divide the twenty-two 
manufacturing sectors into high-tech and low-tech sectors, following 
the standard OECD sector classification.52 
While the first group of 10 OECD countries is included as a benchmark, 
we have chosen the other two country groups from regions that are 
characterized by different historical and political pre-conditions, i.e. 
Asia and Latin America. Whereas the countries in the first group have 
been among the world’s leading industrialized nations for a long time, 
most countries in the two other groups are developing and newly 
industrialized economies that are still at a much lower level of 
economic development. Many of them share a recent history of 
successful economic catch-up, which makes them especially interesting 
for an analysis of absorptive capacity. 
                                                          
51 Stock of R&D, years of schooling and number of patents are available only at the 
country level. 
52 See table 6 in the appendix.  
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Our choice of countries was limited by the availability of sectoral data. 
Sectoral data is not yet available for many developing countries, and 
has only recently been made available for most of the non-OECD 
countries in our sample. As of now, our sample is thus the largest 
possible considering issues of data availability. Furthermore, we have 
excluded developing countries from Africa, as data availability was 
very limited and technology absorption has arguably played only a 
marginal role in these countries until recently (Lall and Pietrobelli, 
2002). 
Data for valued added, gross fixed capital formation and number of 
employees are taken from the UNIDO ISDB (3-4 digit level). Data are 
comparable across years, having been deflated to 2000 prices and 
converted using measures of purchasing power parity (PPP) to US$. 
Both the GDP deflator and the PPP conversion factor are taken from the 
World Bank. The perpetual inventory method (PIM) is used to 
construct the capital stock. 
 
                                                                                                              
 
                                                                
    
  
     
                                                  
 
 
where Kij is capital stock of sector j in country i, Iij is capital 
formation/investment, δK is the depreciation rate set at 4% (Liao et al. 
2009), and   
  is the average growth in the first five years of investment 
series. 
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Human capital is measured by average years of schooling in the 
population in country i, and is taken from Barro and Lee (2010)53. The 
PIM is also used to compute stock of R&D using total R&D expenditure 
in country i deflated to 2000 prices, and converted using measures of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) to US$. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
                                                                  
   
  
     
                                                   
 
where Pi is the stock of R&D in country i, Ri is the expenditure in R&D, 
  
  is the average annual growth rate of R&D and δR is the rate of 
depreciation of R&D stock that we set at 15% (Griliches 1984). 
Data on patents are obtained from OECD. We use the triadic patent 
families which are a set of patents filed at the European Patent Office 
(EPO), the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and 
the Japan Patent Office (JPO), for the same invention, by the same 
applicant. The PIM is used to compute the stock of patents: 
 
                                                                                                             
 
                                                         
     
  
     
                                                          
 
                                                          
53 Ideally, it would be better to use a closer proxy for absorptive capacity, such as the 
number of university graduates in technical subjects. However, for most of the emerging 
economies in our sample, such data is not yet available, or has only very recently been 
made available. 
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where Zit is the stock of patents in country i, TPFi is the number of 
triadic patent families,   
  is the average annual growth rate of patents, 
and    is the depretiation rate set at 15% (Hall and MacGarvie 2010). 
Foreign R&D spillovers are computed using the stock of R&D of the 
United States, Japan, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, which 
are the countries which contributed most to the stock of total R&D over 
the period 1996-2005. The share of imported machinery and equipment 
is calculated by using data on total imports and imported machinery 
and equipment from UN Comtrade, deflated to 2000 prices and 
converted using measures of purchasing power parity (PPP) to US$. 
Distance between capital cities in kilometers is taken from Gleditsch 
(2003). For about 50% of our observations we have a balanced panel, 
while for more than 63% we have 9 out of 10 years, and for almost 70% 
8 out of 10 years.54 
Table 4.1 shows the basic descriptive statistics for all the variables of 
our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Table 7 in the Appendix summarizes the number of available sectors by country and 
by year. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Total OECD 
 Q1 Med. Q2 Mean St.Dev.  Q1 Med. Q2 Mean St.Dev. 
y 6.57 7.98 9.2 7.8 2.06 y 7.01 8.23 9.32 8.17 1.86 
k 7.18 8.85 10.3 8.68 2.19 k 8.0 9.24 10.3 9.08 1.85 
l 9.43 10.8 12.2 10.7 1.98 l 9.79 11.1 12.2 10.9 1.8 
p 27.6 29.2 30.3 28.8 2.08 p 28.8 29.6 30.6 29.8 1.37 
r 26.6 27.3 27.8 27.2 0.7 r 27.5 27.8 27.9 27.6 0.59 
z 3.4 7.22 8.83 6.38 3.42 z 7.34 8.45 9.38 8.56 1.46 
h 2.07 2.23 2.38 2.17 0.31 h 2.23 2.35 2.44 2.35 0.13 
Asia Latin America 
 Q1 Med. Q2 Mean St.Dev.  Q1 Med. Q2 Mean St.Dev. 
y 7.36 8.53 9.65 8.36 1.83 y 4.63 6.36 7.43 6.07 1.96 
k 8.11 9.89 10.9 9.51 1.93 k 5.28 6.5 7.66 6.46 1.87 
l 10.4 11.7 12.7 11.5 1.82 l 7.82 9.23 10.3 9.08 1.73 
p 27.5 29.5 30.2 29.0 1.94 p 24.5 26.6 26.9 26.2 1.39 
r 26.3 26.6 27.3 26.7 0.54 r 26.5 26.7 27.0 26.7 0.32 
z 3.59 5.43 8.19 5.86 3.39 z 0.32 1.73 2.41 1.69 1.2 
h 1.63 2.08 2.36 1.97 0.43 h 1.96 2.02 2.08 2.03 0.11 
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4.4 Results 
 
4.4.1 Frontier Estimates  
 
We report the results of our frontier estimation in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, 
with Table 4.2 showing frontier estimates, and Table 4.3 output 
elasticities. Estimated elasticities are within the range of what is found 
elsewhere in the literature, although we find slightly higher values for 
the elasticity of value added with respect to labour than studies using 
data for earlier periods (Kneller and Stevens 2006, Liao et al. 2009). For 
the full sample, the elasticity of value added with respect to physical 
capital is 0.201, and that with respect to labour 0.802. While we find 
evidence for mildly increasing returns to scale for physical capital and 
labour concerning OECD countries and Latin America (1.025 and 
1.081), returns to scale are slightly decreasing for Asia (0.938). 
The estimated effect of the stock of local R&D on output is strongly 
positive and significant at the 1% level for OECD countries (0.233), but 
only weakly positive and not significant for Asia (0.038). For Latin 
America, stock of R&D has a negative effect on output (-0.426), 
significant at the 10% level. 
Our results for OECD countries are similar to those found by earlier 
studies. Kneller and Stevens (2006) obtain slightly lower coefficients for 
a group of twelve OECD countries during the period 1973-1990 (0.03-
0.09, pp.10). Coe and Helpman (1995) find that for the seven most 
advanced OECD countries between 1971 and 1990, the estimated 
elasticity of TFP with respect to domestic R&D varies between 0.22 and 
0.23, while for the remaining group of fifteen less advanced OECD 
countries, the elasticity lies between 0.6 and 1 (pp. 869). Kneller (2005) 
finds much lower coefficients for a group of twelve OECD countries 
over the same period (0.02-0.04, pp. 10), while Griffith et al. (2004) 
obtain larger coefficients for the same panel of OECD countries (0.4- 
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0.6, pp. 889). However, they use TFP growth instead of TFP as 
dependent variable, and assess the rate of return to R&D. 
 
Table 4.2: Frontier Estimates – Regression Results 
 
 Estimation of equation 2 (page 32) , dependent variable: 
value added  
 Total OECD Asia Latin 
America 
k (capital) 0.354*** 
(0.024) 
0.375*** 
(0.023) 
0.360*** 
(0.079) 
-0.142* 
(0.085) 
l (labour) 0.705* 
(0.035) 
0.503*** 
(0.029) 
0.962*** 
(0.112) 
1.525*** 
(0.129) 
k2 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.048*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
l2 0.013*** 
(0.003) 
0.063*** 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.009) 
-0.030*** 
(0.012) 
lk -0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.105*** 
(0.007) 
-0.021 
(0.012) 
-0.022 
(0.018) 
p (R&D stock) -0.068 
(0.045) 
0.233*** 
(0.064) 
0.038 
(0.076) 
-0.426* 
(0.070) 
r  (R&D expd.) 0.026 
(0.051) 
0.045 
(0.058) 
0.030 
(0.093) 
0.012 
(0.073) 
year2 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0009* 
(0.0005) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
const -1.150 
(0.990) 
-9.568*** 
(1.122) 
-6.3*** 
(1.010) 
4.965*** 
(1.034) 
Log-
likelihood 
-858.355 694.804 -260.021 -106.590 
N 3904 1968 1148 788 
The level of significance is shown with the following notation: *** 1%, ** 5%, 
and * 10%; significant results marked bold.  
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Table 4.3: Elasticity of output with respect to labour and capital (at the 
sample mean) 
 
 Labour Physical Capital 
Total 0.802 0.201 
OECD 0.924 0.101 
Asia 0.763 0.175 
Latin America 0.845 0.236 
 
We thus find that local stock of R&D directly affects production in our 
sample of OECD countries. For Asia, the weaker and not significant 
effect suggests that local R&D plays mainly a role in facilitating the 
absorption of foreign technology, instead of affecting output directly. 
For Latin America, although a negative effect of the stock of local R&D 
on output seems to be counter-intuitive at first sight, our results 
confirm findings by earlier studies. In a study of 16 Latin American 
countries between 1996 and 2006, Castillo et al. (2012) find a negative 
contribution of R&D expenditure to productivity, which they attribute 
to recent changes in the pattern of specialization in the region in favour 
of industries with low-value added content that rely less and less on 
domestic R&D. Cimoli and Katz (2003) make the same argument, 
outlining that “dramatic changes in the sources of technical change” 
have occurred in Latin America in the 1990s, with “a rapidly increasing 
share of external sources emerging at the expense of domestic ones” 
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(Cimoli and Katz (2003), pp. 390). While import substitution policies 
until the 1980s had focused on the building of domestic knowledge 
creation, they maintain that today those industries still relying on 
domestic R&D are inefficient and lagging behind. Efficient industries 
are clustered within the natural resource sectors or are performing 
assembly operations of imported parts (’maquiladoras’), relying almost 
exclusively on foreign R&D and cheap labour. It thus seems that our 
results for Latin America reflect recent structural changes on the 
continent, and capture the decreasing importance of local R&D. 
The estimated effect of foreign R&D spillovers on output is slightly 
lower than what is found elsewhere in the literature (for example Coe 
and Helpman (1995) find an elasticity of TFP with respect to foreign 
R&D spillovers of 0.06-0.092, and Kneller and Stevens (2006) an 
elasticity of output with respect to foreign R&D of 0.084-0.091). 
However, for our sample effects are not significant. This could mean 
that foreign R&D spillovers through machinery and equipment imports 
have only a weak or indirect effect on domestic production. As we are 
only capturing foreign knowledge embodied in R&D intensive inputs, 
we leave out other potential channels through which foreign R&D 
might affect domestic output directly, such as FDI or licensing. 
 
4.4.2 Efficiency Levels 
Table 4.4 presents efficiency scores for low-tech and high-tech sectors in 
each country group. In general, efficiency scores slightly increase over 
the time span covered in our study, with the exception of Latin 
America, where efficiency in high-tech sectors experiences a sharp drop 
after 1999. A temporary drop in high-tech efficiency, albeit less 
pronounced, is also noticeable for Asia and OECD countries after 1999. 
Possibly, the Asian and Russian financial crises and the burst of the 
dot-com bubble are responsible for this drop in high-tech efficiency 
around the turn of the millennium, with the effect in Latin America 
being amplified by the aftermath of recent structural adjustment 
programs that made the region more vulnerable to economic shocks. 
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Table 4.4: Mean efficiency by country, low- and high-tech sectors 
 
 Total OECD Asia Latin 
America 
Year l.tech h.tech l.tech h.tech l.tech h.tech l.tech h.tech 
1996 0.731 0.764 0.793 0.775 0.767 0.837 0.768 0.810 
1997 0.736 0.770 0.802 0.792 0.764 0.835 0.763 0.814 
1998 0.737 0.771 0.796 0.803 0.770 0.823 0.773 0.801 
1999 0.745 0.785 0.798 0.806 0.779 0.853 0.764 0.786 
2000 0.747 0.781 0.813 0.807 0.763 0.839 0.762 0.746 
2001 0.727 0.748 0.810 0.765 0.743 0.831 0.732 0.693 
2002 0.727 0.744 0.804 0.763 0.756 0.834 0.739 0.671 
2003 0.734 0.754 0.810 0.776 0.761 0.843 0.748 0.674 
2004 0.746 0.769 0.825 0.795 0.764 0.846 0.814 0.670 
2005 0.742 0.781 0.822 0.794 0.763 0.854 0.786 0.762 
For the full sample, mean efficiency in low-tech sectors is slightly lower 
than mean efficiency in high-tech sectors (Figure 4.2). However, 
regional differences are quite pronounced. While from 1996 to 2000 
mean efficiency for low-tech and high-tech sectors is almost the same in 
OECD countries, in 2001 efficiency drops notably in high-tech sectors, 
which then remain consistently less efficient than low-tech sectors. In 
Latin America, high-tech sectors are more efficient than low-tech 
sectors until 2000, and then experience a similar, albeit much stronger 
drop. Finally, in Asia high-tech sectors are consistently more efficient 
than low-tech sectors. 
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Figure 4.1: Mean efficiency by country group 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean efficiency by country group, low-tech and high-tech 
sectors 
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Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 look on the performance of individual countries 
within our three regional groups. For OECD countries, a marked drop 
in high-tech efficiency for France, the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy is 
notable from 2000 onwards, with Italy remaining stuck at a level of 
high-tech efficiency that is the lowest of all 22 countries in our sample. 
On the other hand, the United States, Denmark and Norway 
significantly improve their efficiency during the second half of the 
period observed, while efficiency levels for the UK, Germany and 
Belgium remain roughly the same from 1996 to 2005 (see figure 4.3). 
What we capture here is probably the divergence in productivity 
between the US and some Scandinavian countries on the one hand, and 
most European OECD countries on the other hand, which became 
notable since the late 1990s and is most often attributed to the better 
exploitation of ICT-induced productivity gains by the US (Van Ark B., 
2003). Less flexible and more regulated labour markets in Europe might 
also play a role in this respect (Bassanini et al. 2009). 
 
Figure 4.3: Mean efficiency – OECD 
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In Asia, a group of high performers includes South Korea, Japan, 
Singapore and the Philippines, while Indonesia remains at a lower level 
of technical efficiency. India and China lie in between, and seem to be 
fast catching up to the group of high-performers. India significantly 
increased its efficiency between 1997 and 2005, especially in high-tech 
sectors, where it has become the most efficient of all 22 countries in our 
sample by 2005. However, despite a 0.1 increase between 1997 and 
2005, low-tech sectors are still very inefficient in the country, so that, 
with the exception of Mexico, they remain the most inefficient of all 
countries in our sample in 2005 (figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4: Mean efficiency – Asia 
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With respect to the debate about the relative importance of technical 
efficiency improvements to growth in India (Bhaumik and Kumbhakar 
2010, Kim and Saravanakumar 2012), our paper thus finds evidence for 
an increase in technical efficiency, especially in high-tech sectors. The 
marked divide that we find between efficiency in low- and high-tech 
sectors also confirms conclusions by earlier studies (D’Costa 2003), 
which suggest that the Indian economy is driven forward by some 
efficient high-tech industries, especially in the ICT sector, while low-
tech industries are still lagging behind. With respect to China, even 
though we only have data for 2003-2005, it looks as if China has 
successfully managed, within a short time-span, to leave the group of 
low performers and join the group of high-efficiency countries. 
For Latin America, a sharp drop in efficiency for high-tech sectors in 
Chile, Mexico, Colombia and Uruguay is notable between 1999 and 
2001, followed by a slight recovery afterwards. After 2000, high-tech 
sectors are consistently much less efficient in Latin America than in 
OECD countries and Asia (figure 4.5). This drop in efficiency might be 
a consequence of the series of financial crises that hit the continent 
around the year 2000. Colombia was hit by a crisis in 1998, Brazil in 
1999, and Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay in 2001, and most countries 
suffered from a recession for some of the years between 1999 and 2003 
(Rojas-Suarez, 2010). For Colombia and Uruguay, the year of their 
respective financial crisis coincides with the drop in efficiency we 
notice (Figure 4.9 in the Appendix). Although Chile and Mexico were 
not directly affected, their drop in efficiency might be related to close 
links with the crisis countries. For all four countries, the drop in 
efficiency is closely related to negative rates of GDP growth. Chile 
experienced negative GDP growth in 1999, preceding the 0.23 drop in 
high-tech efficiency we notice for 2000-2001 (Figure 4.9). Mexico had a 
short recession in 2001 and low GDP growth rates for 2002 and 2003, 
corresponding with a 0.15 drop in high-tech efficiency for 2000-2002 
(Figure 4.9). In Uruguay, GDP per capita decreased in four consecutive 
years between 1999 and 2002, and high-tech efficiency by 0.13 points 
between 2001 and 2004. Finally, Colombia’s GDP decreased by -4.2% in 
1999, and high-tech efficiency by 0.22 points from 1999 to 2000. The fact 
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that efficiency in high-tech sectors decreased notably during this period 
of economic turbulence, while low-tech sectors remained remarkably 
stable, could indicate that high-tech sectors in Latin America are more 
internationally integrated but also more vulnerable to economic 
perturbations than low-tech sectors. 
 
Figure 4.5: Mean efficiency – Latin America  
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4.4.3 Determinants of Technical Efficiency 
Stock of Patents 
Table 4.5 reports the results of our efficiency estimation. We find that 
an increase in the stock of patents has a negative and significant effect 
on technical inefficiency in high-tech sectors across all country groups. 
A 1% increase in the stock of patents decreases inefficiency in high-tech 
sectors in OECD countries by 0.219%, by 0.14% in Asia and by 0.119% 
in Latin America. 
Interestingly, this effect changes once we look on low-tech industries. 
Here, we consistently find low for OECD countries, with a 1% increase 
in the stock of patents leading to a 0.013% increase in inefficiency, in 
Asia inefficiency increases by 0.177%, and in Latin America by 0.351% 
in low-tech sectors for a 1% increase in the stock of patents. 
Our findings differ from those of Kneller and Stevens (2006), who find 
that R&D “has only an insignificant effect on inefficiency” (Kneller and 
Stevens 2006, pp. 19). Using stock of patents instead of R&D 
expenditure as a proxy for the effectiveness of domestic R&D in a 
stochastic frontier framework reveals a significant effect of domestic 
R&D on efficiency, which however fundamentally differs between 
high-tech and low-tech sectors. 
Large parts of the more general literature on the effects of R&D on 
productivity also find such a difference between high-tech and low-
tech sectors (see Kumbhakar et al. (2011) for a literature review). While 
domestic R&D has generally a strong and positive impact on 
productivity in high-tech sectors, the impact is low or not significant for 
low-tech sectors. For instance, using a dataset of top European R&D 
investors over the period 2000–2005, Kumbhakar et al. (2011) find that 
R&D in low-tech sectors “has a minor effect in explaining 
productivity”, whereas in high-tech sectors the effect of R&D on 
productivity is found to be strong and positive. By analyzing a sample 
of 156 large Taiwanese firms for the period 1994-2000, Tsai and Wang 
(2004) find a positive but very low effect of R&D on productivity for 
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low-tech sectors, whereas the effect was positive and strong for high-
tech sectors. 
Our findings are coherent with previous studies in that we also find a 
substantial difference between high-tech and low-tech sectors. 
However, the difference we find is even larger, since for our sample an 
increase in the stock of domestic knowledge has a positive effect on 
inefficiency for low-tech sectors. 
 
Table 4.5: Regression Results – Efficiency Determinants  
 
 
Estimation of equation 4 (page 33), dependent variable: 
technical inefficiency of production 
 Total OECD Asia Latin 
America 
z (stock of 
patents) 
-0.187*** 
(0.013) 
-0.219*** 
(0.021) 
-0.140*** 
(0.019) 
-0.119* 
(0.071) 
low-tech*z 0.361*** 
(0.020) 
0.232*** 
(0.021) 
0.317*** 
(0.020) 
0.470*** 
(0.074) 
h (human 
capital) 
 0.660*** 
(0.136) 
-0.843*** 
(0.168) 
-1.876*** 
(0.198) 
-0.363 
(0.437) 
low-tech*h -2.992*** 
(0.157) 
-0.548*** 
(0.174) 
-0.685*** 
(0.208) 
-3.705*** 
(0.3402) 
const. 0.838*** 
(0.211) 
1.722*** 
(0.354) 
1.654*** 
(0.413) 
4.066 
(0.935) 
sigma 
squared 
0.658*** 
(0.022) 
0.291*** 
(0.007) 
0.558*** 
(0.029) 
0.377*** 
(0.022) 
gamma  0.943*** 
(0.004) 
0.974*** 
(0.003) 
0.912*** 
(0.009) 
0.911*** 
(0.012) 
N 3904 1968 1148 788 
The level of significance is shown with the following notation: *** 1%, ** 5%, 
and * 10%; significant results marked bold. 
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This effect is much stronger in developing countries than in our group 
of OECD countries. A possible explanation might be that we use 
patents as a proxy for effectiveness of R&D. As patenting activity is 
higher in high-tech sectors (Brouwer and Kleinknecht 1999, Lotti and 
Schivardi 2006), and resources for R&D are scarce, a crowding-out 
effect might occur that diverts resources from R&D in low-tech to R&D 
in high-tech sectors, due to expected greater returns to R&D in high-
tech sectors. As we have only aggregate data for patents, it is possible 
that we capture this effect in our regression. An increase in patenting 
activity in an environment where resources for R&D are relatively 
scarce could thus lead to the negative effect on efficiency in low-tech 
sectors that we find. If this interpretation comes close to what is 
actually happening, it would suggest that the crowding-out effect is 
stronger for Latin America than for Asia. 
 
Human Capital 
The second determinant of technical efficiency we examine is human 
capital, measured by years of schooling (Barro and Lee 2010). We find 
that an increase in years of schooling has almost always a strong and 
significant negative effect on technical inefficiency, with the effect being 
stronger for low-tech sectors. For high-tech sectors, increasing years of 
schooling by 1% decreases inefficiency by 0.843% in OECD countries, 
by 1.876% in Asia, and by 0.363% in Latin America, although results for 
Latin America are not significant. In low-tech sectors, a 1% increase in 
years of schooling decreases inefficiency by 1.39% in OECD countries, 
by 2.56% in Asia and by 4.07% in Latin America. 
Our results are in line with those of previous studies. For a group of 
twelve OECD countries, Kneller and Stevens (2006) find that a 1% 
increase in human capital decreases inefficiency by 1.86%. Their 
coefficient is slightly higher than ours. As they look on an earlier period 
(1973-1990), this could be a sign for marginal decreasing returns of 
human capital over time in OECD countries. To our knowledge, there 
are no previous studies that use a stochastic frontier framework and 
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specifically look at the effect of human capital on inefficiency in Asia 
and Latin America. However, looking at a group of 57 developing 
countries for the period 1960-2000, Mastromarco (2008) finds that 
increasing human capital by 1% decreases inefficiency by 2.33%. 
We find that an increase in human capital reduces technical inefficiency 
more in low-tech than in high-tech sectors. This could mean that the 
type of human capital captured by the years of schooling data provided 
by Barro and Lee (2010) is more relevant in low-tech than in high-tech 
sectors. While an additional year of schooling has a strong impact on 
efficiency in low-tech activities, efficiency improvements in high-tech 
sectors are mainly induced by increases in “highly qualified” human 
capital (e.g. education at a post-graduate and doctoral level, specialist 
qualifications, etc.), which are not captured by Barro and Lee’s data on 
years of schooling. 
Comparing OECD countries and Asia to Latin America reveals further 
interesting results. Whereas in the former the effect of schooling on 
low-tech sectors is only slightly higher than the effect on high-tech 
sectors, for Latin America the effect of schooling on efficiency in low-
tech sectors is exceptionally strong, whereas the effect on high-tech 
sectors is relatively small and insignificant. This suggests that the 
quality of human capital in low-tech sectors is still very low in Latin 
America. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
Using a stochastic frontier framework and data for 22 manufacturing 
sectors, we found notable differences in technical efficiency between a 
group of 10 OECD countries, 7 Asian countries and 5 Latin American 
countries. As the efficiency of a country’s manufacturing industries is a 
strong determinant of their capacity to absorb technology produced 
abroad, these differences are important to understand differences in 
growth and productivity, especially for developing countries which 
depend to a large extend on foreign technology. 
We examine the effect of two potential determinants of a country’s 
absorptive capacity: human capital measured by years of schooling, 
and the effectiveness of domestic R&D, proxied by the stock of patents. 
We find that years of schooling always have a strongly positive effect 
on efficiency, especially in low-tech sectors and for developing 
countries. The stock of patents positively affects efficiency in high-tech 
sectors, but has a consistently negative effect on efficiency in low-tech 
sectors, especially for Asia and Latin America. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study using a stochastic frontier 
approach and sectoral data not only for OECD countries, but also for 
two groups of emerging economies. Using sectoral data permits us to 
disaggregate the efficiency effect of schooling and stock of patents 
between low-tech and high-tech sectors. However, as in many 
developing countries sectoral data has only been made available 
recently, and is not yet available to a sufficient extend for human 
capital, stock of R&D and patents, there is a lot of scope for future work 
once better data becomes available. 
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4.7 Appendix 
 
Table 4.6: Sector classifications (ISIC Rev. 3) 
 
15 Food and beverages low-tech 
16 Tobacco products low-tech 
17 Textiles low-tech 
18 Wearing apparel low-tech 
19 Leather, leather products and footwear low-tech 
20 Wood products (excl. furniture) low-tech 
21 Paper and paper products low-tech 
22 Printing and publishing low-tech 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products, nuclear fuel low-tech 
24 Chemicals and chemical products high-tech 
25 Rubber and plastics products low-tech 
26 Non-metallic mineral products low-tech 
27 Basic metals low-tech 
28 Fabricated metal products low-tech 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. high-tech 
30 Office, accounting and computing machinery high-tech 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus high-tech 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment high-tech 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments high-tech 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers high-tech 
35 Other transport equipment high-tech 
36 Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. low-tech 
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Table 4.7: Number of available sectors by country and year 
 
 
Year ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 Total 
Belgium    22 22 22 22 22 22 22 154 
Bolivia 18 18 18        54 
Chile 18 18 18 16 16 19 19 19 19  162 
China        22 22 22 66 
Columbia 18 18 18 18 21 20 20 20 20 20 193 
Germany    18 22 22 22 22 22 22 150 
Denmark 22 22 22 22 20 20 20 19 19 19 205 
France 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 210 
Indonesia     22 22 22 22 22 22 132 
India 18 18 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 212 
Italy 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 217 
Japan  22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 220 
S. Korea 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 220 
Mexico 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 21   175 
Netherlands 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 21 21 21 215 
Norway  21 22 22 21 21 21 21 22 21 192 
Philippines       22 22 22 22 88 
Sweden   21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 189 
Singapore 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 210 
United 
Kingdom 
22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 220 
United 
States 
18 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 216 
Uruguay 18 22 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 204 
Total 304 350 358 378 404 405 427 446 426 406 3904 
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Figure 4.6: Efficiency – Descriptive Statistics 
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Figure 4.7: Mean efficiency by country – OECD 
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Figure 4.8: Mean efficiency by country – Asia   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
152 
 
Figure 4.9: Mean efficiency by country – Latin America   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
